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A SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF
MAINE'S FREEDOM OF ACCESS ACT
This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: a
democracy works best when the people have all the information
that the security of the Nation permits. No one should be able to
pull curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed
without injury to the public interest.1
INTRODUCTION
There seems to be no absolute freedom of information. Even Pres-
ident Lyndon B. Johnson's declaration made on July 4, 1966, as he
signed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) into law, indicates
the limitations accompanying most right-to-know laws from their in-
ception. A delicate balance must be struck between the public's ac-
cess to public business and the public interest, between the public's
access and a person's right to privacy, and, at the federal level, be-
tween the public's access and national security.
Maine also crafted a limited freedom of information law, the Free-
dom of Access Act ("FOAA" or "the Act"), 2 seven years before the
FOIA, in which executive sessions were the legislative trade-off for
its enactment.3 Yet, from 1959 until 1975, the year it was drastically
amended, access in Maine was more expansive than at any other
time in its history. Not only was the statute liberally drafted, but
there were fewer statutory exceptions, the back-door way of limiting
public access to records. Those exceptions have swollen to more
than one hundred, severely curtailing public access to what would
otherwise be public business.
Indeed, the prophesy of the late media sage and newspaper col-
umnist Walter Lippmann, written more than forty years before
President Johnson's comments, haunts us today.
At different times and for different subjects some men impose and
other men accept a particular standard of secrecy. The frontier be-
tween what is concealed because publication is not, as we say,
'compatible with public interest' fades gradually into what is con-
cealed because it is believed to be none of the public's business.'
This Comment will analyze the evolution of this "standard of se-
1. Federal Freedom of Information Act's bill-signing statement of President Lyn-
don B. Johnson on July 4, 1966, quoted in HR. Rzp. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Se.,
pt.1 at 1. The bill went into effect on July 4, 1967.
2. See Appendix for text of the FOAA, M R v. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 401-410
(1989 & Supp. 1990-1991).
3. Memorandum of Professor Brooks W. Hamilton, Chairman, Maine Joint Com-
mittee on Freedom of Information (May 7, 1959) (on file with author).
4. W. LiUrMANN, PuBLc OPInION 44 (1922).
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crecy" in Maine, gauged by the state's right-to-know law," from
common law to the most recent amendments made in the Freedom
of Access Act in 1989. Part II will take a brief historical look at the
common law right to public access in England and in the United
States as a backdrop to Maine's enactment of the Act in 1959. Part
M's overview of the Act will lead into Part IV's section-by-section
analysis of all ten sections, via legislative history, of the numerous
attorney general opinions issued, some Superior Court decisions and
all of the Law Court cases that pertain to the Act. Finally, Part V
will suggest some of the problems posed by the current Act and will
propose possible measures the Legislature can take to make the
Maine Act fully divorced from any "standard of secrecy."
I. HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW
All fifty states now have some kind of freedom of information law.
Although Maine's law was enacted in 1959, seven years before the
federal FOIA was adopted, it was not among the earliest as to public
records: Louisiana was the first to enact such a law in 1940.0 How-
ever, not until 1983 did Mississippi enact a law.
7
A distinction must be made between open records and open meet-
ings laws. The federal FOIA, for example, grants access to records
while a separate law, known as the Government in the Sunshine
Act," grants access to agency meetings. Some states follow the fed-
eral model, but in Maine the distinctions are assigned to different
sections of the FOAA's ten sections. Thus, the title Freedom of Ac-
cess refers to access to both records and to meetings.
With respect to governmental records, the notion of freedom of
information statutes in this country originated in England, where
the need for public records in judicial proceedings opened the door,
albeit slightly, to public access of public records.9 This was accom-
5. Maine's FOAA, called the "Right to Know" statute when it was enacted in
1959, was probably derived from the title of the book H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT
TO KNOW: LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS (1953), which began as
a report to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. The author, Harold Cross, a
former New York lawyer who retired to the Skowhegan, Maine, area was inatrumen.
tal in lobbying for and drafting Maine's first statute.
6. 1940 La. Acts 195 (codified at LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 44:1 to 44:42 (West 1982)).
7. 1983 Miss. Laws 424 (codified at MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-61-1 to 25-61-17 (Supp.
1989)).
8. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b (1977).
9. H. CROSS, supra note 5, at 25. The United States Supreme Court has never
interpreted the first amendment as providing for access to government information
other than criminal proceedings and judicial records. See infra notes 232-33. How-
ever, it has been argued by first amendment commentators that effective operation of
the democratic process requires openness:
This is not an area where the courts, applying First Amendment doctrines,
can be of much assistance. But the principle which should be followed by
the legislature and executive is plain: the maximum amount of information
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plished via court order for a record in the possession of a party to
the case or by writ of mandamus for a record in another's posses-
sion.10 Although the English door-opening was a grant of inspection
in the case of a particular need, namely litigation, it was not accom-
panied by the assumption that all other needs were thereby ex-
cluded. Yet, by the time the practice wended its way to the United
States, it was interpreted by some American courts as the sole pur-
pose for gaining access to records."' This narrow litigation-only in-
terest was broadened, but the requirement that the requester of a
public record have some specific interest in the document sought
prevailed for many years."
Title abstract and title insurance companies provided the impetus
for opening vast amounts of public records, including wills, taxes,
judgments, liens, deeds and mortgages, even though it was for busi-
ness reasons rather than for use in litigation or for altruistic causes,
such as policing of government actions.Y Ironically, newspapers were
slow in seeking access to public records.1'
In Maine, up to the time of the FOAA's enactment, a public rec-
ord was one "required by law to be kept, or necessary to be kept in
the discharge of a duty imposed by law [or] made by a public officer
authorized to perform that function." 15 However, "public" under
common law, did not mean open to inspection by citizens, unless
expressly allowed by statute,"6 the converse of the Act's mandate to-
should be disclosed. Implementation of the principle is difficult and little
progress has been made in developing techniques for its realization in
practice.
T. EuMasoN, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AuiDumzr 112 (19863).
10. For a history of English procedure regarding public records, see State ex rel.
Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 334-37 (1879); Nowack v. Auditor General, 243
Mich. 200, 205-206, 219 N.W. 749, 750-51 (1928). See generally H. CROSS, supra note
5, at 25-33.
11. See, e.g., H. CROSS, supra note 5, at 25-33.
12. See, e.g., 53 C.J. Records § 40(1) (1931) ("At common law a person may in-
spect public records in which he has an interest or make copies or memoranda thereof
when a necessity for such inspection is shown and the purpose does not seem to be
improper .. "), cited in H. CROSS, supra note 5, at 29.
13. IL CROSS, supra note 5, at 28. The effect the federal FOIA would have on
business was not anticipated prior to adoption, but it is estimated that FOIA reque3ts
by business outpace all other categories of requests. Stevenson, Protecting Business
Secrets Under the Freedom of Information Act: Managing Exemption 4, 34 ADm.
L. Rnv. 207 (1982).
14. H. CRoss, supra note 5, at 29. A congressional study conducted between 1972
and 1984 revealed that media use of the federal FOIA accounted for only six percent
of all requests made. The Freedom of Information Reform Act: Hearings on S. 774
Before the Subcomm. on Govt. Information, Justice and Agriculture of the House
Comm. on Govt. Oper., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 699 (1984) (statement of H. Relyea, Spe-
cialist in American National Govt., Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress).
15. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (1944), reprinted in 1943-1944 Me. Att'y Gen. Rep. 111.
16. Id.; Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (1951), reprinted in 1951-1954 Me. Att'y Gen. Rep. 70
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day, where all records are public unless excepted.
Maine's first case regarding public records, Hawes v. White, 17 in
1876, reflects the early prevailing attitude that the requester have a
specific interest in the public records. In that case the petitioners,
county commissioners, succeeded in obtaining a writ of mandamus
compelling the register of deeds to allow them access to records in
order that they might change the books to a new indexing system.
The court granted the writ to the commissioners for the narrow pur-
pose of complying with their duties: "[t]he petitioners have suffi-
cient interest in the subject matter to authorize them to petition for
the writ.""8
Furthermore, only records that were "required by law," so-called
"public records," like the deeds in Hawes, could be accessed by that
limited group of requesters who had the requisite special interest. In
Maine, the 1883 Revised Statutes' codification of such required-by-
law records ranged from those to be kept by the poundkeeper' to
those of the licensed liquor agent.20 Today, the Maine Act gives the
right of access to "every person. '21 In addition, the common law re-
striction of right of access accorded to only those persons with spe-
cific purposes is obsolete.22
England's legacy regarding open meetings nowhere approaches the
relative openness of its access to records history. The Parliament
closed its proceedings to any outsiders from the beginning, originally
for the purpose of excluding the King, but later for the purpose of
harboring comments and final actions from constituents.2 At the
("The fact that records are public does not, however, subject such records to the in-
spection of all persons.").
17. 66 Me. 305 (1876).
18. Id. at 306.
19. R.S. tit. II, ch. 23, § 6 (1883):
Each pound-keeper, in a book provided by the town, shall record at length
all certificates received from persons committing beasts to the pound, or
finding stray beasts .... and shall note therein when a beast was im-
pounded... and said book shall be delivered to his successor in office,...
and be open to the inspection of all persons interested.
20. R.S. tit. II, ch. 27, § 19 (1883):
Agents of towns authorized to sell intoxicating liquors, shall keep a record
in a suitable book, of the amount of intoxicating liquors purchased by them
.... [T]hey shall also keep a record of the kind and quantity of liquors
sold by them, the date of sale and the price, the name of the purchaser and
the price for which it was sold; specifying in case such sale is made to the
municipal officers of any other town, the name of such town, which record
shall be open to inspection.
21. MF Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 408 (1989).
22. See infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of limited
access to commercial information.
23. T.P. TAsw LL-LANomEAD, ENGLISH CONsTrrUTIONAL ISTORY 618 (1896) (" 'To
print or publish the speeches of gentlemen in this House,' said Mr. Pulteney in 1738,
'looks very like making them accountable without doors for what they say within.' ")
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turn of the nineteenth century, representatives of the press were the
least welcome of any of Parliament's non-members.2 ' Finally, in the
mid-1800's the exclusionary rules deteriorated to the point where
both the press and "strangers," those who were not Parliamentary
members, were able to observe the formerly closed proceedings. 2
In the American colonies, the legislatures, pursuant to English
dictates, continued the tradition of closed proceedings. Victims of an
unfree press, like Peter Zenger, spurred the inclusion of press free-
dom into the Bill of Rights, leading to the notion of a more open
government.
In Maine, as early as 1822, Laws of the State of Maine provided
for public notice of meetings, 26 and in 1883 warrants to call town
meetings were required to "specify the time and place at which the
meeting shall he [sic] held; and in distinct articles shall state the
business to be acted upon at such meeting; and no other business
shall be there acted upon. '27 Today, not only is an entire section of
the Act devoted to public notice, but all "public proceedings" are
open to the public for whatever reason.28
IL HOW TO USE THE FOAA
The declaration of public policy, that government open its records
and its proceedings to the public, applies to the state and all its
subdivisions and to governmental associations.20 Yet, despite the in-
clusion of all levels of government, not all branches are under the
Act's purview. The judicial branch is glaringly absent from the pro-
visions of the FOAA, although the public's access to criminal trials
was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court's 1980 decision in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.30
The key section of the Act is the definitions provision,3 1 since it
defines the scope of the Act, not only the phrases. For instance, the
(quoting Cobbett's Parliamentary History 806). See generally H. CROSS, supra note 5,
at 179-82.
24. Id. at 619-21.
25. Id. at 621. Press galleries were established in 1834, and in 1845 "strangers"
were officially allowed to observe. Id.
26. 1822 Me. Laws 114, § 5 provided:
Be it further enacted, That when there shall be occasion of a town meeting,
the Constable or Constables, or such other person as shall be appointed for
that purpose by warrant from the Selectmen... shall summon and notify
the inhabitants of such town.... the manner of summoning the inhabi-
tants to be such as the town shall agree upon ....
27. R.S., ch. 3, § 5 (1883).
28. M. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 406 (1989). For a further discussion of the public
notice provision, see infra notes 272-78 and accompanying text.
29. Id. at § 402(2) (Supp. 1989-1990).
30. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). For a more detailed discussion of access to governmental
proceedings, see infra notes 60-90 and acompanying text.
31. Ma. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402 (1989 and Supp. 1989-1990).
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"public records" definition appears expansive, but a careful reading
reveals it is composed of three elements which must exist before in-
spection may be had. A public record must be: (1) matter, (2) in the
custody of an agency or public official at all governmental levels, and
(3) received or prepared for use in connection with governmental
business or containing information relating to the transaction of
public or governmental business. 32 Even if the document sought
meets those criteria, it must still escape the swinging axe of the
seven exemptions to the definition. It is in the first of these exemp-
tions where the "confidential-by-statute" creature lurks,83 encom-
passing in its mighty jaws more than one hundred such statutes.
When a document clears all of these hurdles, it then meets the
"public records" definition and "every person shall have the right to
inspect and copy" it. 34 However, if inspection of a document re-
quires translation from one medium to another, the requester may
have to pay the agency in advance for the cost of that service.
Once a public record is requested and paid for, if necessary, an
agency is not required to respond within a designated period unless
the response is a denial, in which case the agency must so notify the
requester in writing within five working days of the request.38 But if
the requester is unhappy with the denial, an appeal must be filed in
any superior court in Maine within five working days of the receipt
of the denial. After a trial de novo, which takes precedence over all
cases on the docket except habeas corpus and actions brought by
the state against individuals, the court will order disclosure if it de-
termines "such denial was not for just and proper cause." 3 The pen-
alty for a "willful violation" of the FOAA, a civil violation, carries a
fine not to exceed $500 and to be paid to the state by the agency,
and not by the official responsible.3 7
As to the meetings provisions of the FOAA, their scope also de-
pends upon the "'public proceedings" definition. Governmental
meetings'are open to the public unless an executive session is called
and the statute's many conditions are met. Executive sessions can
be held only if agreed to by three-fifths of the members of an entity,
if a motion indicates the "precise nature of the business" of the ses-
sion, and if no final approval of official actions are taken in the exec-
utive session.38 Any person charged or investigated during the exec-
utive session, as well as any person bringing such charge, is
permitted to attend. If an entity violates the conditions of the exec-
32. Id. § 402(3).
33. Id. § 402(3)(A).
34. Id. § 408.
35. Id. § 409.
36. Id. § 409(1).
37. Id. § 410.
38. Id. § 405.
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Maine's FOAA purposive statements have indisputably commanded
the attention of the courts"9 and the attorney general 0 in interpret-
ing the statute. Further guidance is provided in section 401's rule of
construction, also added in 1975, that the Act "shall be liberally con-
strued and applied to promote its underlying purposes and poli-
cies." 51 The Law Court first acknowledged this legislatively man-
dated rule in Moffett v. City of Portland,2 adding the corollary that
any exceptions to the Act's disclosure requirements must be strictly
construed.53
The potency of the liberal construction rule's effect is demon-
strated in several attorney general opinions, where it is cited as the
factor that tips the scale in favor of disclosure." For example, in the
attorney general opinion concerning a Department of Educational
and Cultural Services investigation into alleged wrongdoing at the
Baxter School for the Deaf,55 the liberal construction directive was
decisive in ruling that the report was open to public inspection: "In
light of these specific instructions, both by clear terms of the statute
and by the courts, to protect the public's right to access to the work-
ings of its government, close questions must be resolved, wherever
(2d ed. 1986) ("However hungry for statutory guidance, [udges] will not be signifi-
cantly helped by expanding the kind of legislative ineptitudes that unfocused and
loosely conceived policy announcements inevitably constitute.").
But cf. Professor Llewellyn ("[Slound recitals of situation and purpose constitute
one of the great drafting devices and one of the vital drafting arts.. . .") Id. at 284.
49. See, e.g., Moffett v. City of Portland, 400 A.2d 340, 347-48 (Me. 1979) ("In
construing the Freedom of Access Act we have kept steadily before us the legisla-
ture's declared purpose that to a maximum extent the public's busines3 must be done
in public."); Sulloway v. Inhabitants of Kittery, No. CV-60-73, slip op. at 3 (Me.
Super. Ct, York Cty., May 21, 1974) ("Obviously these purposes are that the actions
of public bodies be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.').
50. See, e.g., Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 2 (June 3, 1977) ("It is clear from this statement
that the Legislature's primary concern was that decisions which will affect the public
should be arrived at openly and with full disclosure of the materials being considered
and the decisions which are made.").
Although opinions of the attorney general are not binding, they are sought by state
agencies and legislators seeking clarification of the FOAA. Of the nearly 50 attorney
general opinions rendered regarding the Act, almost all have been addressed to gov-
ernmental agencies.
51. P.L. 1975, ch. 758 (codified at Ma Rv. STAT. Am tit. 1, § 401 (1989)).
52. 400 A.2d 340 (Me. 1979).
53. Id. at 348. See Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) for
use of the same corollary in construing the federal FOIA.
54. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 87-11,3 (state Regional Planning Commissions are subject
to the FOAA) ("Weighing these factors, and bearing in mind that in enacting the
Freedom of Access Law the Legislature provided that the law 'shall be liberally con-
strued ... ."'); Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 79-144, 3 (names of petroleum products retailers
receiving fuel from the state under the "set-aside" program and the amounts they
receive are subject to disclosure under the FOAA) ("In view of this, and in view of the
fact the Freedom of Access Law is to be liberally construed. . .
55. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 82-42, 5.
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utive session by taking a final action, any person learning of this
conduct may file an appeal in a superior court within the thirty-day
period mandated by Rule 80B of the Maine Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, since no appeals period is provided for in the FOAA.s9 If the
action is found to be illegally taken, the action is ordered to be "null
and void," and the entity, not the officials responsible, is subject to
the civil penalty of up to $500.40
Members of the public who attend the non-executive session
meetings are permitted by the FOAA "to make written, taped or
filmed records of the proceedings, or to live broadcast the same."' 1
Public notice for public proceedings must be given in "ample time
to allow public attendance." '4 2 There are no express appeals
processes in the FOAA, beyond that for the executive sessions, for
violations of any other open meetings provisions.
III. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
A. Section 401: Declaration of Public Policy; Rules of
Construction
The FOAA's preamble, whose essence has remained largely un-
modified since 1959,"3 expressly states the Legislature's intent: "The
Legislature finds and declares that public proceedings exist to aid in
the conduct of the people's business. It is the intent of the Legisla-
ture that their actions be taken openly and that the records of their
actions be open to public inspection and their deliberations be con-
ducted openly."" A third sentence, added in 1975,45 warns against
circumventing the spirit of the FOAA by holding clandestine meet-
ings on private property without notice and opportunity for public
attendance ." This policy addition was apparently designed to ac-
company the more stringent executive sessions section, amended in
1975.4
7
Although the merits of public policy clauses are debated,"
39. See infra notes 324-27 and accompanying text.
40. M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 409(2) (1989).
41. Id. § 404.
42. Id. § 406.
43. P.L. 1959, ch. 219, repealed and replaced by P.L. 1975, ch. 758 (codified at
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 401 (1989)).
44. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 401 (1989).
45. P.L. 1975, ch. 758.
46. P.L. 1975, ch. 758 (codified at ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 401 (1989)).
47. The executive sessions section was fortified by requiring that a 3/5 vote,
rather than a majority, is needed to call an executive session. Moreover, the motion
for an executive session must specify "the precise nature" of matters to be considered
therein. P.L. 1975, ch. 758 (codified at ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 405 (1989)). For
further discussion of the executive sessions provision, see infra notes 245-71 and ac-
companying text.
48. See, e.g., R DicKERsON, THE FUNDAmENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING § 13.5, at 287
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possible, in favor of public disclosure."56
B. Section 402: Definitions
1. Section 402(1): "Conditional Approval"
Included in section 402(1) since 1975,7 the definition of "condi-
tional approval" assists in the execution of section 407(1), which re-
quires every agency to make a written record of decisions regarding
licenses and employee dismissal. 8  Conditional approval is
"[a]pproval of an application or granting of a license, certificate or
any other type of permit upon conditions not otherwise specifically
required by the statute, ordinance or regulation pursuant to which
the approval or granting is issued."5
2. Section 402(2): "Public Proceedings"
The term "public proceedings" is defined to assist in the execu-
tion of sections 403 through 406, all of which pertain to open meet-
ings. While the original definition, as enacted in 1959, subjected ad-
ministrative and legislative bodies of the state, counties,
municipalities and "any other political subdivision of the State" to
provisions of the Act, it limited the Act's application to meetings of
only those entities "composed of three or more members, with which
function it is charged under any statute or under any rule or regu-
lation. . ."60 Thus, from 1959 until major revision of the Act in
1975-nearly one-half of its existence-the FOAA gave public access
to meetings of only permanent bodies whose decision-making sprang
from statute, rule or regulation. Excluded from the Act, then, were
meetings of ad hoc committees or commissions whose functions were
limited to advice or investigation.6
The Legislature's removal in 1975 of this constricting "statute,
rule or regulation" language from the public proceedings definition
furnished latitude for later judicial determination of which entities
are bound by the FOAA. Indeed, although the Law Court has had
only one occasion 2 to determine which entities are bound by the
56. Id. at 5. See also Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 80-95, 5 ("Thus, all questions as to [the
Act's] applicability should be resolved in favor of the public's right to access.").
57. P.L. 1975, ch. 758 (codified at h. Rrv. STAT. Am. tit. 1, § 402(1) (1989)).
58. See infra notes 279-83 and accompanying text for discussion of ML Ray. STAT.
ANN. fit. 1, § 407(1) (1989).
59. MA. Rav. STAT. ANN. fit. 1, § 402(1) (1989).
60. P.L. 1959, ch. 219, repealed and replaced by P.L. 1975, ch. 758 (emphasis
added).
61. The Law Court, in Lewiston Daily Sun v. City of Auburn, 544 A.2d 335 (Me.
1988), recognized the constraints created by the original definition. The court noted
that it was much narrower in scope than the present definition, and that the earlier
version applied "only to those permanent bodies that possessed actual decisionmak-
ing authority and had been specifically charged by statute or rule to act." Id. at 337.
62. Id. at 335.
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Act, it did so broadly. In Lewiston Daily Sun v. City of Auburn, the
court held that meetings of the City of Auburn's special civil service
study committee constituted "public proceedings." 3 The committee,
which had no budget and whose seven unpaid members were ap-
pointed by the mayor at the direction of the city council, was as-
signed to investigate alleged wrongdoing on the city's Civil Service
Commission and to make recommendations to resolve any problems
found." The special committee's "close link" with the council and
mayor, and its "investigatory functions that if not delegated to it
would have been exercised directly by the city's governing authori-
ties," brought it within the ambit of section 402(2), according to the
court, despite statutory silence regarding a municipal "committee." 0
The city argued that the Legislature never intended the scope of
the statute to include an entity such as the Auburn Civil Service
Study Committee, because subsection 402(2)(C) does not mention
the term "committee" in its litany of municipal bodies.06 Moreover,
the city pointed to the subsection's express inclusion of the "com-
mittees and subcommittees" of the Legislature67 and the boards of
trustees of the University of Maine, the Maine Maritime Academy
and the Maine Vocational-Technical Institute System. 8 The court,
however, dismissed this form-over-substance argument; it could not
prevail in light of the Act's mandate of liberal construction.6
The court's dicta in dismissing the city's second argument, that
the committee was merely ad hoc and therefore temporary, provides
further guidance as to which entities are bound by the Act. The
court noted that the permanence of an entity is irrelevant to appli-
cability of the FOAA after the Legislature's 1975 removal of the re-
striction that the bodies must function pursuant to statute, rule or
regulation. It is sufficient that the committee was performing an in-
vestigatory function which affected "'any or all citizens' of the City
63. Id.
64. The committee's first meeting was, in fact, open to the public. But members
voted to hold all future sessions in private. Id. at 336.
65. Id. at 335.
66. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402(2)(C) (Supp. 1989-1990) provides that the
transactions of "any board, commission, agency or authority of any ... municipality"
is encompassed by the "public proceedings" definition.
67. ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402(2)(A) (1989).
68. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402(2)(B) (Supp. 1989-1990).
69. Lewiston Daily Sun v. City of Auburn, 544 A.2d at 337 ("Considered in isola-
tion, such appellations when attached to a particular public entity reflect little more
than the arbitrary decision of those who created the entity.").
However, the dissent noted that "the legislature was obviously aware of the distinc-
tion between a board, commission, agency or authority and this type of ad hoc com-
mittee," and that the omission of "committee" from the list of municipal entities was
deliberate. Id. at 339 (Clifford, J., and Glassman, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the
dissent argued that this ad hoc committee's limited advisory function, its lack of pub-
lic funding, and its temporariness of term exclude it from provisions of the Act. Id.
[Vol. 43:169
FREEDOM OF ACCESS ACT
of Auburn. 70
Although the court declined to address the Act's applicability to
meetings held by committees "completely disassociated from munic-
ipal governing entities," it provided numerous examples of how the
City of Auburn had clearly associated itself with the special commit-
tee in question, thereby bringing it within the FOAA.71 These recent
liberal guidelines produced by the Law Court provide needed direc-
tion for the superior courts72 and should steer the state's attorney
general away from the conservative tack it has taken in several opin-
ions issued on the same question.
As recently as 1985, three years before Lewiston Daily Sun, but
ten years after section 402(2) was amended to delete the restrictive
"statute, rule or regulation" language, the attorney general ruled
that the Blue Ribbon Commission on Corrections was not subject
to the FOAA,73 a result that would be untenable after Lewiston
70. Id. at 338 (quoting MIu. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402(2) (Supp. 1989-1990)).
71. Lewiston Daily Sun v. City of Auburn, 544 A.2d at 338. The court was espe-
cially concerned with the committee's lack of autonomy, as evidenced by its "signifi-
cant links" with the Auburn mayor and city councih
The mayor created the committee on the order of the city council and ap-
pointed all of its members. He attended the committee's first meeting and
there charged the committee to investigate the problems that were plaguing
the City's Civil Service Commission. He told the committee it could inter-
view whomever it pleased, but recommended that it question certain named
individuals. He asked the committee to make recommendations to him and
the city council on how best to resolve the Civil Service Commission's
problems and even on whether that commission should be continued or
abolished. He also stated his belief that the committee could hold its meet-
ings in private. The committee had available to it as well the legal advice of
the city attorney on whether its meetings were covered by the Act. As the
committee's investigation progressed, the city council voted to direct the
mayor to invite certain individuals to be interviewed by the committee. Fi-
nally, after the Superior Court temporarily enjoined it from further closed
meetings, the committee voted to suspend its meetings "pending the out-
come of present litigation or direction from [the mayor] and/or the City
Council."
Id.
72. At least one lower court decision relied on the Law Court's guidance in Lewis-
ton Daily Sun. In Guy Gannett Publishing v. City of Augusta, No. CV-88-383 (Me.
Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., Oct. 25, 1988), the court ruled that the 10-member ad hoc
committee of the Augusta Boards of Trade, formed to consider the city's parking
problems, was engaged in "deliberations [that] involve at least three high ranking
officials in City government, are conducted on city premises, involve an important
investigatory function affecting any or all citizens of the City of Augusta, and have an
impact on the expenditure of significant public monies." Id. at 3-4.
Moreover, employing the language of Lewiston Daily Sun, the court cautioned
against bypassing the FOAA by delegating "the function to another entity created
expressly for the purposes of performing this function." Id. at 4 (citing Lewiston
Daily Sun v. City of Auburn, 544 A.2d at 338).
73. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 85-19.
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Daily Sun.74 That attorney general opinion, several others before
it,75 and even one as recent as 1987,76 relied on what should now be
an obsolete six-step inquiry.77 The test necessarily narrows the scope
of section 402(2) by focusing on the mere status of the entity as a
"state agency or authority" 78 rather than looking to the "transac-
74. The Blue Ribbon Commission on Corrections had a $25,000 budget and its
members were compensated for expenses in attending the meetings, far more than
was available to the volunteer members of the budgetless Auburn Civil Service Study
Committee in Lewiston Daily Sun. But, like the special study committee, the Blue
Ribbon Commission on Corrections' term was not permanent and its functions were
advisory. Nevertheless, in Lewiston Daily Sun the Law Court found these character-
istics irrelevant in light of the Legislature's 1975 removal of the requirement that
entities exercise some legislative or administrative authority. Lewiston Daily Sun v.
City of Auburn, 544 A.2d at 338.
75. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (July 12, 1976) (Governor's Tax Policy Committee is not a
state agency because it is composed of private officials giving private advice without
statutory authorization); Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 15, 1976) (Citizen's Dickey-Lincoln
Project Impact Review Committee is not a state agency because it basically consists
of private individuals and is advisory); Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (May 17, 1977) (Joint
Select Committee on State Policy for Preservation, Development and Utilization of
Historical and Cultural Resources is an advisory committee of the Legislature, but is
statutorily created and its members receive expenses); Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (July 26,
1978) (Maine Potato Council is not a state agency because it was not intended by the
Legislature to be a state agency even though it is funded through the potato tax and
it expends state tax monies); and Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 80-95 (Interrelations Committee
of School Administrative District No. 53 and Maine Central Institute is a local
agency, because despite its advisory function, the "transactions of any functions" lan-
guage of section 402(2) prevails in light of the vital area of education).
76. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 87-11, 3 (Regional Planning Commissions are subject to
the FOAA).
77. The test inquires whether the entity: (1) is created by statute; (2) has an in-
definite term; (3) is comprised of a membership that is prescribed by statute; (4)
receives public funds; (5) has a membership that is compensated above its expenses;
and (6) exercises governmental, rather than advisory, power. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 85-
19, 2. "The more that these questions are answered in the affirmative, the more likely
that the agency will be deemed to be subject to the Freedom of Access Law." Op. Me.
Att'y Gen. 87-11, 3.
See also supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text for Lewiston Daily Sun's con-
sideration and rejection of almost all of the above features.
78. The genesis of this six-part test is in Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (July 12, 1976) (meet-
ings of Governor's Tax Policy Committee not subject to the FOAA), where the central
issue was whether the entity constituted a "board or commission of any state agency
or authority," as found in ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402(2)(B) (1989). Because
"state agency" is not defined in the FOAA, the opinion relied on the Administrative
Code, which defines state agency as a body "authorized by law to make rules or to
adjudicate contested cases." Ma. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 2301-1 (1964), repealed and
replaced by ME. R.v. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 8001 to 11008 (1989). Thus, the opinion,
while purporting to recognize the Legislature's abandonment of the "statute, rule or
regulation" language, plainly ignored that change by incorporating a definition of
agency that brought back the old language.
By the time of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Corrections opinion in 1985, the
attorney general opinions had distilled the question simply to whether a given entity
was a "state agency or authority" rather than determining whether the entity per-
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tions of any functions affecting any or all citizens" of the entity in
question.
The Legislature further broadened the scope of "public proceed-
ings" with removal of the quantity of membership requirement in
1973,79 presumably to bring entities otherwise subject to the FOAA
into compliance regardless of size. In addition, the Legislature's
practice, starting in 1975, of enumerating specific entities encom-
passed within the "public proceedings" definition, served to aug-
ment the scope of section 402(2). Thus, the present definition ex-
pressly includes: the Legislature and its committees and
subcommittees;8 0 any board or commission of any state agency or
authority; the Board of Trustees and its committees and subcom-
mittees of the University of Maine System, Maine Maritime Acad-
emy, and the Maine Vocational-Technical Institute;8 any board,
commission, agency or authority of any county, municipality, school
district or regional, political or administrative subdivision;8 2 and the
full membership meetings of any association whose membership is
composed exclusively of counties, municipalities, school administra-
tive units or other political or administrative subdivisions.83
Of the above enumerated entities, only the committees and sub-
committees of the Board of Trustees of the higher educational insti-
tutions created any legislative debate. The controversy began when
the University of Maine System Board of Trustees began excluding
the press and public from some subcommittee meetings." The attor-
ney general's office, upon the request of a legislator, ruled that these
committees and subcommittees were in violation of the FOAA.8 5
Consequently, the legislator sought to clarify the ambiguity of sec-
tion 402(2)(B) by specifically including these entities. The few legis-
formed any "functions affecting any or all citizens of the State." Op. Me. Att'y Gen.
85-19, 2.
79. P.L. 1973, ch. 433.
80. P1,. 1975, ch. 758.
81. P1T. 1975, ch. 758, amended by P.L. 1977, ch. 164, and P.T. 1989, ch. 35.
82. P.. 1975, ch. 758.
83. P1,. 1989, ch. 358.
84. The Board did this based on an interpretation that absence of "committees
and subcommittees" from section 402(2)(B) exempted these entities from the FOAA.
Legis. Rec. 697 (1977).
85. Senator Curtis, whose district of Penobscot includes the University of Maine
at Orono, requested the opinion. Legis. Rec. 697 (1977). In that opinion, the attorney
general advised that liberal construction of the Act demands that committees and
subcommittees of the Board of Trustees be subject to the open meetings provision.
Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (Nov. 23, 1976) 1. However, the opinion noted the apparent dis-
crepancy in the Act regarding these committees and subcommittees: they were not
expressly included in the open meetings provision but were expressly exempt from
the public records provision, § 402(3)(E). Id. at 3. Therefore, "it may be appropriate
for the Legislature to clarify these matters ... regarding the rights of public access
to the business of committees and subcommittees of the University of Maine and the
Maine Maritime Academy." Id.
1991]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
lators aligning with the Board position feared that open subcommit-
tee meetings would "inhibit discussion" and discourage would-be
trustees from seeking those positions."0 A majority of legislators fa-
vored inclusion of the subcommittees of the boards, noting that de-
cisions regarding the "expenditure of millions of [tax] dollars"
should be open to the public.8 7 Moreover, the Legislature has ven-
tured beyond the FOAA in enacting statutes that mandate specific
entities to hold their meetings in public: governmental ethics and
election practices commission, 8 health care financing commission,"
and regional planning commissions.90
3. Section 402(3): Public Records
The Legislature has tinkered frequently with the "public records"
86. Legis. Rec. 697 (1977). Senator Hewes of Cumberland contrasted the tempera-
ment of legislators with that of possible future trustees:
Now we in the Legislature perhaps have thicker skins than some of the
Trustees. I know a gentleman that has given a great deal of money for a
new hockey rink at Orono at the University of Maine. Men like that per-
haps would be on the Trustees, and yet would not like to have everything
that they say be open to the public, to second guessing or to something that
you can take out of context.
Id.
Furthermore, Senator Hewes drew Maine's private institutions into the debate:
I personally feel that others [sic] schools, Colby, Bowdoin or Bates, private
schools who do not have to have all of their sub-committee meetings open
to the public, perhaps will get ideas presented at the sub-committee meet-
ings that will be beneficial to their respective colleges.
Id.
The Senate vote was 26 to 2 in favor of including the subcommittees in the public
proceedings definition. Id. at 698.
87. Id. at 697. Senator Curtis, sponsor of the bill to include the boards' subcom-
mittees in the definition of public proceedings, and supported by university students
and state newspapers, attempted to assuage opponents:
I have discussed this Bill and its concept with Members of the Board of
Trustees, although not all of them, and I have found them, those that I
have discussed it with, to be in agreement with the general concept, espe-
cially when I assured them that although the terms of the Freedom of Ac-
cess Law would apply under this Bill clearly to the sub-committees of the
Board of Trustees, so would the exceptions which are provided.
Id.
The most ardent support of inclusion of the committees and subcommittees outside
of the Legislature came from the press. See, e.g., Those Committees, Bangor Daily
News, Mar. 25, 1977 (editorial); Trustees: Opening the Meetings, Portland Press
Herald, May 23, 1984 (editorial).
88. Mx. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1005 (1989). However, the public is excluded if six
of the seven members vote to close the meeting. Id.
89. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 383(2) (Supp. 1989-1990).
90. Mx. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 2324 (Supp. 1989-1990). Although section
402(2) expressly includes the "commission" of any "regional" subdivision, the re-
gional planning commission law goes a step further by deeming the minutes of the
proceedings as a "public record." Id.
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definition over the last thirty years, drastically curtailing accessibil-
ity to public documents. The original 1959 statute's right to public
inspection of all public records, "including any minutes of meetings
of such bodies or agencies as are required by law," °s has been trans-
formed beyond recognition to the present definition, last amended
in 1989,92 which includes seven enumerated exemptions. The 1959
enactment was an extraordinary departure from common law:
As far as records are concerned ... in the past almost every...
agency or department has held it to be its own right to decide what
records ... it will make public or will withhold .... This cannot
be the case any more. We have the attourney [sic] general's opin-
ion and Harold Cross' opinion that our law means that any record
not specifically exempt by statute is now a public record.0'
The language in Maine's 1959 statute, allowing inspection of all
records in government custody regardless of their source or the rea-
son for their creation or acquisition, is considered the most liberal
drafting form of a public records provision" and exists today in only
a handful of states, including Iowa95 and New York.,* One of the
most restrictive definitions, on the other hand, mandates that public
records are only those "directed to be made or received by any stat-
ute. ' 97 This language, briefly included in the FOAA in 1975, when
eliminated by emergency legislation, 8 is used by a minority of states
today.99 The language currently found in the statute of Maine, and
91. P.L. 1959, ch. 219.
92. P.L. 1989, ch. 358. Although the Legislature broadened the public records def-
inition to include information in the possession of custody of an "azsocintion" com-
posed of governmental entities, it added two exemptions: confidential records of these
associations and any of their materials regarding their positions on insurance
legislation.
93. Memorandum of Professor Brooks W. Hamilton, Chairman, Maine Joint Com-
mittee on Freedom of Information (May 7, 1959) (on file with the author) (emphasis
in original).
94. Braverman & Heppler, A Practical Review of State Open Records Laws, 49
GEo. WASH L. Ray. 720, 733 (1981).
95. IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.1 (West 1989) (" '[P]ublic records' includes all records,
documents ... of or belonging to this state or any county, city, township, school
corporation, political subdivision .... 19.
96. N.Y. PuE. OFF. LAw § 86 (McKinney 1988) ("'Record' means any information
kept, held, filed, produced or reproduced by, with or for an agency or the state legis-
latur .... ).
97. But the most restrictive statutes are those that allow "public interest nondis-
closure," or complete agency discretion in denying access to information the agency
believes is counter to the public interest. See Braverman & Heppler, supra note 94,
at 736-37.
98. P.L. 1975, ch. 483 ("public records shall mean any writing ... under or re-
quired or directed to be made or received by any statute or by any rule or regulation
... "), repealed and replaced by P.L. 1975, ch. 623.
99. Although the Law Court was never confronted with this restrictive phrasing,
other state courts interpreting simila "required to be kept by law" definitions con-
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the second most liberal public records definition, 100 provides that a
public record is one whose origins are "in connection with" govern-
mental business or "contains" such information.
Maine's current statutory definition of "public records" is com-
posed of three elements: (1)"any written, printed or graphic matter
or any mechanical or electronic data compilation from which infor-
mation can be obtained, directly or after translation into a form sus-
ceptible of visual or aural comprehension," (2) that is in the posses-
sion or custody of an agency or public official of the state or any of
its political subdivisions or an association composed of such entities,
and (3) has been received or prepared for use in, or contains infor-
mation relating to, the transaction of public or governmental
business.10'
a. Section 402(3): Physical Description of a Public Record
The first element, a physical description of a public record, has
seemingly changed only slightly since it was first defined in 1975 as
"any writing or printing or any material in any electronic or other
form of tape, in any form necessary .... "1102 However, absence in
the current statute of the "in any form necessary" language can only
serve to limit accessibility to what is expressly delineated, a legiti-
mate concern in this era of ever-burgeoning forms of communica-
tion. 103 The computer, the major tool of record storage today, is only
strue it to include only agency-prepared records and not those transmitted to the
agency by private individuals. See, e.g., Trenton Times Corp. v. Board of Educ. of
Trenton, 138 N.J. Super. 357, 360, 351 A.2d 30, 31-32 (App. Div. 1976); Wayside
Farms, Inc. v. State, 50 Ohio Misc. 13, 16, 364 N.E.2d 297, 299 (1977).
This restrictive language harks back to common law days in Maine, when the attor-
ney general's office advised the Board of Nursing that the flow of information into the
Board was not public information, while that flowing from the Board was. Op. Me.
Att'y Gen. (1961), reprinted in 1961-1962 Me. Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 83. Thus, appli-
cations, transcripts of high school and school of nursing and letters of reference would
be confidential while the examination records with achievement grades would be pub-
lic records since they were records made by the board. Id.
100. See Braverman & Heppler, supra note 94, at 733-34.
101. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402(3) (Supp. 1989-1990).
102. P.L. 1975, ch. 483, repealed and replaced by P.L. 1975, ch. 623, emergency
legislation (deleting the "in any form necessary" language).
103. Cf. MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 10-611 (1984) (emphasis added):
Definitions .... (f)Public Record - (1) "Public record" means the origi-
nal or any copy of any documentary material that: . . . (ii)is in any form,
including.
1. a card;
2. a computerized record;
3. correspondence;
4. a drawing;
5. film or microfilm;
6. a form;
7. a map;
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obliquely included in Maine's Act under "electronic data compila-
tion.""' Yet, computer record-keeping appears to be the new battle-
field for unwilling agencies and a public demanding information.'"
The computer-records issue has never been before the Law Court,
but the attorney general's office, in an opinion to Maine's Secretary
of State regarding disclosure of names and addresses of driver licen-
sees, was not hindered by the physical description language in the
Act.106 The attorney general interpreted the statute to include com-
puterized records, because the computer tape sought, was an "elec-
tronic data compilation" and therefore accessible.'0"
8. a photograph or photostat;
9. a recording;, or
10. a tape ....
104. h. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402(3) (1989). Most states and the federal FOIA
do not specifically refer to computer records in their definitions of public records. For
a look at the problems computer-generated records present to the requester, see Elec-
tronic Access to Government Information, A Report by the American Society of
Newspaper Editors (April 1990).
105. The battle has already begun at the federal level where it is settled that
"computer-stored records, whether stored in the central processing unit, on magnetic
tape or in some other form, are still 'records' for purposes of the FOIA." Long v. IRS,
596 F.2d 362, 365 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980). However, the
United States Supreme Court, in United States Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 109 S.Ct. 1468 (1989), cast doubt on the status
of such records. In that case, a unanimous Court ruled that the FBI did not have to
disclose computerized rap sheets--the criminal history of an individual--even though
that information was compiled from the public records of state and local law enforce-
ment agencies. The Court denied public record status to rap sheets because of their
privacy interest to individuals. "The substantial character of that interest is affected
by the fact that in today's society the computer can accumulate and store informa-
tion that would otherwise have surely been forgotten long before a person attains the
age of 80, when the FBI's rap sheets are discarded." Id. at 1480. Moreover, the Court
noted: 'Tlainly there is a vast difference between the public records that might be
found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police sta-
tions throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single
clearinghouse of information." Id. at 1477.
In Maine, a person is now guilty of criminal invasion of computer privacy if he
intentionally accesses any computer resource knowing that the person is not author-
ized to do so. P.L. 1990, ch. 620 (codified at Ma Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 432)
(Supp. 1990-1991).
The original bill sought to include a provision making it a crime to "disclose[] or
take[] data, programs or supporting documentation which is a trade secret.. . or is
confidential as provided by law ... ." Li). 627 (114th Legis. 1989). Thus, any mem-
ber of the public who received information inadvertently given them by a custodian
of such record could conceivably be charged with such a crime.
106. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 79-161.
107. Id. The requester in this case was Datatron, which sought only the names
and addresses of Maine licensees for commercial purposes. However, complete reports
of a driver's record, including convictions, adjudications, accidents, and suspensions,
are available to anyone requesting such information at a cost of 34.00. M& Ray. STAT.
ANN. tit. 29, § 57-A (Supp. 1989-1990).
Ironically, access to the computer tape was not even the central issue in the Data-
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b. Section 402(3): Possession or Custody of an Agency or Public
Official
The second element's most troublesome aspect is determining the
meaning of "agency" and "public official," since records in their pos-
session or custody may be accessible. Accordingly, interpretation of
the public records provision, void of precise guidance, has led to
anomalous results in attorney general opinions.
For example, in ruling that the Blue Ribbon Commission on Cor-
rections was not subject to the FOAA's public proceedings provision,
the attorney general reasoned that the commission was also exempt
from the public records provision because it was not a "state agency
or authority."' 08 However, the opinion deemed those records at the
next step, transmission to the governor, as public records, because
they "would then be in the possession of a 'public official of this
State.' ,o9 Thus, it appears that records in the hands of an entity
not meeting the public proceedings definition metamorphose into
public records once in the custody of a bona fide public official.10
The Law Court, aside from originally establishing, in State v.
Brown,"" and reaffirming in Wiggins v. McDevitt,"' that a deputy
sheriff is a public officer, has provided no direction in determining
''agency" or "public official."
c. Section 402(3): "Received or Prepared for Use in" or "Contain-
ing Information" Relating to Public Business
The third element, the origin of public records, limits inspection
to records (1) "received or prepared for use in connection with the
transaction of public or governmental business," or (2) "contain[ing]
information relating to the transaction of public or governmental
tron request. The real issue was the cost of copying such data, a problem falling
under Mx. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 408 (1989).
108. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 85-19.
109. Id. at 4.
110. A further sampling of attorney general opinions indicates a reliance on this
"metamorphisis-of-materials" test. In Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 79-139, 2, the attorney gen-
eral advised that although the Budworm Policy Review Committee's meetings were
not open to the public, their written records and materials were available for inspec-
tion once transmitted to the Conservation Commissioner. Likewise, in Op. Me. Att'y
Gen. 1 (July 12, 1976), the attorney general noted that although the Governor's Tax
Policy Committee was not subject to the open meetings provision of the Act, its rec-
ommendations "finally accepted by the Governor would again be the subject of public
scrutiny . .. ."
See also Op. Me. Att'y Gen (Dec. 15, 1976) for similar treatment of the Citizen's
Dickey-Lincoln Project Impact Review Committee.
For a proposal to eliminate these unwarranted results by bringing all advisory enti.
ties within the scope of the FOAA, see infra notes 350-59 and accompanying text.
111. 129 Me. 169, 151 A. 9 (1930) (deputy sheriff is a public officer).
112. 473 A.2d 420, 421 (Me. 1984) (part-time deputy sheriff is public officer).
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business."'1 '8
However, it is the "containing" language of section 402(3) that
makes possible broad constructions of public record. Indeed, the
Law Court has so liberally construed this as to include the personal
tax return of a public official. In Wiggins v. McDevitt,'" the plain-
tiff, editor and publisher of the weekly Ellsworth American, sought
access only to information that would reveal the fees received by
defendant deputy sheriff in his service of civil process. 10 The court
held that the defendant's only record of these fees, his personal copy
of his individual income tax return, was open to inspection. 10 De-
spite the "attenuated relationship" between the tax return and the
defendant's public duty, the court found not that the return was
prepared in connection with the transaction of public or governmen-
tal business, but that it contained information "relating to the
transaction of public business. '11m Furthermore, the court dismissed
the defendant's argument that an alternative source of the service of
process fees information lay in the files of courts throughout the
state: section 402(3)'s definition "does not turn on the availability of
other sources for the information sought."118
In addition, the court rejected the lower court's finding that tax
113. Ma REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402(3) (1989).
114. Wiggins v. McDevitt, 473 A.2d at 420.
115. Id. Maine law provided for sheriffs and deputy sheriffs to serve civil process
and listed the fees for various types of service. Ma REv. STAT. ANN. tit 30, § 1051
(1978), repealed by P.L. 1987 ch. 737, Part A, § 1. Deputies who were not salaried or
who did not receive per diem pay could collect from the litigants and retain these
fees. MI. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2(4)(B) (1978), repealed by P.L 1987, ch. 737, Part
A, § 1.
The procedure for collection required the person serving process to make a return
that included the fee charged for service and mileage. Once completed, the return was
to be delivered to the litigant or his attorney for payment to the sheriff who then files
the return in the appropriate court. Wiggins v. McDevitt, 473 A.2d at 421. Id.
Here, the editor sent a letter to the Hancock County sheriff and the defendant, a
part-time deputy sheriff, requesting examination of "public records" of the service of
process fees received. The defendant sent the editor a written denial, within the stat-
utory response time, stating that he was not a public official, the records sought were
not "public," and all of the information was available at courthouses in Maine and
wherever returns of service had been fied.
116. Wiggins v. McDevitt, 473 A.2d at 424. However, only the portion that re-
vealed income resulting from his official duties could be disclosed. Id. For further
insight into how the Law Court grants access to segregable portions of otherwise con-
fidential information, see Guy Gannett Publishing Co. v. University of Maine, 555
A.2d 470, 471-72 (Me. 1989).
117. Id. at 422 ("A liberal construction of the language of section 402(3) permits
no other conclusion.").
118. Id. Although based on a federal statute, the result in United States Depart-
ment of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Pres, 489 US. 749
(1989), where a comprehensive computerized rap sheet was held not accessible even
though all the information could be amassed from the public records of state and
local law enforcement agencies, provides an interesting contrast.
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returns are confidential by statute and thereby exempt from the
FOAA under section 402(3)(A). 119 Those statutes, the court noted,
make confidential the returns that are filed and prevents disclosure
only of these filed copies, not disclosure by the taxpayer of his own
copy. 120
Four years later, in Bangor Publishing Co. v. City of Bangor,12 1
the Law Court again liberally construed the public records defini-
tion, this time to include the names and addresses of unsuccessful
applicants for the chief of police position. Although the Legislature
later "overturned" the court and created statutory confidentiality
for these applicants,"2 2 the court's unanimous opinion is instructive
in how the public records definition is interpreted.
In that case the court noted that the city conceded, "as it must,"
that the information sought and "contained" in the applications was
"information relating to the transaction of public or governmental
business.' 12 3 Despite the city's assurances in public advertisements
of the position that all information received would be confidential,
the court held that the names and addresses were public records."
4
d. Section 402(3)(A)-(G): Exemptions
Once the public records definition has been satisfied, there is the
additional barrier of exemptions. Section 402(3) comprises seven
enumerated exceptions; however, the first, records designated confi-
dential by statute, incorporates well over one hundred statutory
exceptions."15
Although not expressly included in the original 1959 statute, the
119. Wiggins v. McDevitt, 473 A.2d at 423. The superior court judge had relied on
both federal statute, 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103 (1989), and state statute, ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 36, § 191 (1978 & Supp. 1982-1983). Id.
120. Wiggins v. McDevitt, 473 A.2d at 423. The dissent argued that the "Court's
mechanical interpretation" of the statute was overbroad and exceeded the legislative
purpose. Id. at 424 (Roberts, J., dissenting). "Even a private diary, assuming it con-
tained information relating to the transaction of public business, would be subject to
citizen inspection." Id. at 425.
121. 544 A.2d 733 (Me. 1988).
122. P.L. 1989, ch. 402 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7070(1) (Supp.
1989-1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, §§ 503(1) and 2702(1) (Supp. 1989-1990)).
For a more detailed discussion of this exemption to the public records provision,
see infra notes 160-163 and accompanying text.
123. Id. at 735. For a discussion of this case from the argument of confidentiality
under the Civil Service Applicants Law, see infra notes 157-159 and accompanying
text.
124. Id. at 736. Cf. Moffett v. City of Portland, 400 A.2d 340, 348 (Me. 1979)
("[C]ontracted-for confidentiality requires more than merely closing sessions at which
interrogation of police officers is conducted; it also requires protection for any tran-
script made of the interrogation.").
125. For a list of confidential information, ranging from sardine council records to
marijuana therapeutic research, see the "Confidential Or Privileged Information" en-
try in the index of the Maine Revised Statutes Annotated.
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"except as otherwise provided by statute" was an implicit limitation
on access to public records. 2 In 1975, with the creation of a public
records definition, that exception was expressly added.1 " Later that
year, the first two of the substantive exceptions arrived, with other
clarifications of the Act, via emergency legislation: records within
the scope of privilege against discovery and legislative records and
reports.1 28 It was the latter exemption that sparked the most exten-
sive recorded debate in the history of the FOAA. The debate was a
struggle between legislators who wanted to hold out the Legislature
as an exemplar of open government129 and those who feared intru-
sion not of constituents but of lobbyists.130 The proponents of the
126. In his May 7, 1959 memorandum to the Joint Committee on FOI, written
shortly after the FOAA was enacted, Professor Hamilton explained some of the bar-
gaining involved in passing the bill
Furthermore, it seemed to me that any State government agency which is
responsible for personal records that shouldn't be public ought to have that
responsibility spelled out in the law governing it. This might mean a lot of
small law changes, but it really makes more sense. Also, it gives us a chance
to know exactly what is, and what isn't, public record in any agency. Any-
thing that isn't specifically exempt, is now public....
... In some cases I had to convince [state department heads] to agree to
limit their exemptions drastically. In the end I came up with a series of
agreements, some to withdraw entirely, all to agree not to amend our FOI
bill, all to be satisfied with exemption of certain specific records.
Id. at 2.
127. P.L. 1975, ch. 483, § 3, repealed and replaced by P.L. 1975, ch. 623, § 1.
128. P.L. 1975, ch. 623, § 1.
129. Rep. Perkins of South Portland argued that holding public office can involve
sacrifices:
We were elected Representatives and Senators, if you will, chosen by the
people to represent their interests in a public capacity and when we were
elected we gave up a certain privilege, if you will, and that privilege was a
luxury of remaining private citizens to the extent of our legislative capaci-
ties here. It seems to me that if any one of my constituents so chooses to
come up here and go through the legislative research office, looking at my
papers, I have absolutely nothing to hide.
Legis. Rec. B2298 (1975).
130. Rep. Tierney of Durham, later attorney general, led the charge against open-
ing the records of the Legislative Research Office, which is responsible for assisting in
the drafting of bills:
Now, no constituent of mine has ever tried to see my file. It is not a ques-
tion of your constituents driving here to Augusta and asking to see your file.
The people who want to see the file are the lobbyists .... It is that sim-
ple. I don't blame the lobbyists for wanting to know absolutely everything
in there .... It seems to me that as I am working out in my own mind
what I want for the content of the bill or content of an amendment that
that and the working papers which go into that input deserve to be confi-
dential When I make that amendment and put it on the floor of this
House, then it is for the people and at that time, of course, I do have noth-
ing to hide.
Legis. Rec. B2299 (1975).
MAINE LAW REVIEW
confidentiality exemption for legislative working papers prevailed,1""
thereby creating an area of confidentiality for themselves that no
other legislative body at any other level of Maine government,
county or local, enjoyed at the time.
Again in 1975, the Legislature expanded the circle of confidential-
ity to include two additional categories of exemptions: material pre-
pared for and used in negotiations by a public employer and work-
ing papers of the subcommittees of the Board of Trustees of the
University of Maine System and the Maine Maritime Academy or of
those institutions' faculty and administrative committees.131
But what confidentiality the Legislature gives, it can also revoke.
In 1977, the Legislature not only eliminated the exemption granted
two years earlier to the Boards of Trustees, and their committees
and subcommittees, but it expressly severed them from the new
402(3)(E). 33 This new pared-down exception, however, continued to
protect the working papers of all faculty and all of the administra-
tive committees of the two institutions, except for the Administra-
tive Council of the University of Maine, a body comprised of the
presidents of each campus within the system and responsible for al-
location of monies appropriated by the Legislature to the university
as a whole.1 3 4
Further expansion of the exemptions in 1989, to include the work-
ing papers and insurance-related materials of local and county gov-
131. The vote in the House was 92 for exemption and 36 against. Legis. Rec.
B2300 (1975).
132. P.L. 1975, ch. 758.
133. P.L. 1977, ch. 164, § 2. At the same time the Legislature revoked confidenti-
ality status of the Boards of Trustees, it expressly included them within the public
proceedings provision. P.L. 1977, ch. 164, § 1. See also supra notes 84-87 and accom-
panying text.
The attorney general advised as far back as 1976 that liberal construction of the
Act demands that committees and subcommittees of the Board of Trustees be subject
to the open records and open meetings provisions. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (Nov. 23,
1976). "Rather, it must be assumed that committees and subcommittees of boards of
trustees, as official groups acting under authority of the board of trustees, must be
subject to the same rules of freedom of access as the board of trustees themselves."
Id. at 2. The opinion added that "[ilt may be appropriate for the Legislature to clar-
ify these matters. . . regarding the rights of public access to the business of commit-
tees and subcommittees of the University of Maine and Maine Maritime Academy."
Id. at 3. Thus, the attorney general's call for legislative clarification did not go
unanswered.
134. P.L. 1977, ch. 164, § 2. The new law also specifically included the Adminis-
trative Council in the public proceedings definition, thereby unquestionably bringing
this entity fully under the aegis of the Act. P.L. 1977, ch. 164, § 1. Ten years later,
however, the express inclusion of the Administrative Council was deleted. P.L. 1987,
ch. 402, § 1. The Legislature eliminated all statutory reference to the Administrative
Council because "the existing language is obsolete in that the council as a body no
longer carries out the functions foreseen when the university system was created."
L.D. 227, Statement of Fact (113th Legis. 1987), enacted as P.L. 1987, ch. 20.
[Vol. 43:169
FREEDOM OF ACCESS ACT
ernment associations,1 5 has swelled the current enumerated exemp-
tions to seven: (1) records that have been designated confidential by
statute;136 (2) records that would be within the scope of a privilege
against discovery or use as evidence recognized by the courts of this
State in civil or criminal trials if the records or inspection thereof
were sought in the course of a court proceeding;137 (3) records, work-
ing papers and interoffice and intraoffice memoranda used or main-
tained by any legislator, legislative agency or legislative employee to
prepare proposed Senate or House papers or reports for considera-
tion by the Legislature or any of its committees during the biennium
in which the proposal or report is prepared;8 8 (4) material prepared
for and used specifically and exclusively in preparation for negotia-
tions, including the development of bargaining proposals to be made
and the analysis of proposals received, by a public employer in col-
lective bargaining with its employees and their designated repre-
sentatives;8 9 (5) records, working papers, interoffice and intraoffice
memoranda used by or prepared for faculty and administrative com-
mittees of the Maine Maritime Academy, the Maine Vocational-
Technical Institute System and the University of Maine System, but
not including their boards of trustees, or their committees and sub-
committees;140 (6) records, working papers, interoffice and intraoffice
memoranda used by or prepared for local or county government as-
sociations;" and (7) materials related to the development of posi-
tions on legislation or materials that are related to insurance or in-
surance-like protection or services which are in the possession of a
local or county government association.1 42
In spite of the ever-growing litany of exceptions to the public
records definition and the resulting erosion of the FOAA, the re-
maining provision that can be employed to limit the scope of these
exceptions is the liberal construction mandate. Thus, both the Law
Court and the attorney general have managed to find accessibility of
public records in a few close-call cases.143
(i.) Section 402(3)(A): Records Designated Confidential by
Statute
Akin to the federal FOIA's third exemption,'14 Maine's FOAA sec-
135. P.L. 1989, ch. 358 (codified at Mh. Rv. STAT. AN. tit. 1, § 402(3)(F), (G)
(Supp. 1989-1990)).
136. Id. § 402(3)(A).
137. Id. § 402(3)(B).
138. Id. § 402(3)(C).
139. Id. § 402(3)(D).
140. Id. § 402(3)(E).
141. Id. § 402(3)(F).
142. Id. § 402(3)(G).
143. See supra notes 49, 54-56 and accompanying text.
144. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(3) (1977). ("This section does not apply to matters that
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tion 402(3)(A) protects from disclosure any record designated as
confidential by statute. The confidentiality statutes that generate
the greatest number of attorney general opinions and most cele-
brated Law Court decisions are those dealing with the files of public
employees. Providing an exemption nearly identical to the federal
FOIA's sixth exemption, 45 the Maine Civil Service Law contains
four additional exceptions to the rule of public disclosure as to per-
sonal information, two of which have drawn the greatest scrutiny. 140
The first such exception is for those portions of public employee
personnel records that include "medical information of any kind, in-
cluding information pertaining to diagnosis or treatment of mental
or emotional disorders."' 47 The second exception protects from dis-
closure "complaints, charges or accusations of misconduct, replies to
those complaints, charges or accusations and any other information
or materials that may result in disciplinary action.148 However, if
disciplinary action is taken, the final written decision relating to
that action is no longer confidential after it is completed.4
The Law Court recently addressed these personnel file exceptions
in Guy Gannett Publishing Co. v. University of Maine.5 0 In this
case, the publishing company sought access to the University's set-
tlement agreement with the former women's basketball coach. 0 1 Af-
are ... (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute ... provided that such
statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as
to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withhold-
ing or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.").
145. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(6) (1977) ("personnel and medical files and similar files
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy").
146. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7070(2)(A)-(E) (1989). The Civil Service Law
expressly refers to the FOAA's § 402(3) in providing confidentiality and an exemption
to the "public records" definition for five areas of personnel information. Id. §
7070(4). This comment will discuss only two of those areas: public employee records
that include medical information; and records that include complaints, charges or ac-
cusations of misconduct or information that could lead to disciplinary action. Fur-
thermore, there will be a discussion of § 7070's confidentiality provisions for appli-
cants for public sector jobs. The three personnel exemptions not discussed in detail in
this comment are: performance evaluations and personal references submitted in con-
fidence; information pertaining to the credit worthiness of a named employee; and
information pertaining to the personal history, general character or conduct of mom-
bers of an employee's immediate family.
147. M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7070(2)(A) (1989).
148. Id. § 7070(2)(E).
149. Id.
150. 555 A.2d 470 (Me. 1989).
151. The settlement agreement was signed on June 25, 1988 by Coach Peter M.
Gavett, University of Maine President Dale Lick and Associated Faculties of the Uni-
versity of Maine System President David Rankin. It provided that Gavett: resign;
vacate his office; refrain from, entering the University's gymnasium for one year; re-
ceive a lump sum of $36,000; avoid all contact with present or former members of the
women's basketball team; and discharge the University from all claims or actions. Id.
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ter analyzing the two exceptions in the Civil Service Law discussed
above, the court modified the lower court's order of disclosure of the
entire settlement by excising one sentence pertaining to "medical
information."1 52 The Law Court noted that the "broadly drawn"
medical exception must encompass express and implied descriptions
of an employee's "medical condition" or "medical treatment," de-
spite the narrow construction required for FOAA exceptions.'"
Yet, while respecting the broad nature of the medical exception,
the court complied with the narrow scope of the "complaints,
charges, or accusations" exception: "[s]tanding alone these
paragraphs cannot be said to contain any complaint, charge, or accu-
sation of misconduct, reply thereto, or information that may result
in disciplinary action."'"
Public sector job applicants, as well as employees, are provided
statutory confidentiality.1 55 Although the status of applicant-pro-
at 473-74.
Gavett, who intervened as defendant in this action along with the Maine Teachers
Association, resigned his position a few months after he had accepted a three-year
reappointment. Id. at 471. This unexpected resignation prompted Gannett to make a
series of FOAA requests to the University. Id. The University, arguing that it was not
required to disclose such information, denied all requests, and Gannett filed this ac-
tion in Superior Court after the University's final denial in August. Id. As a result.
the University released only four documents tangentially related to Gavett's reap-
pointment and resignation. Id. Gannett's further request led to the University's in
camera submission of the settlement agreement. Id.
152. Id. at 471-72. The superior court, after in camera review of the settlement,
ordered disclosure of the entire agreement, but stayed the order pending appeal. Id.
at 471.
153. Id. at 471.
154. Id. at 472.
155. There are civil service applicant statutes for each level of government. state
(ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7070(1) (Supp. 1989-1990)); county M. REv. STAT. AN&
tit. 30-A, § 503(1) (Supp. 1989-1990)); and municipal (Ma. REv. STAT. AN& tit. 30-A, §
2702(1) (Supp. 1989-1990)). After the 1989 emergency legislation, they are all identi-
cal and provide that public sector employee information is open to public inspection:
A. Except as provided in this [paragraph], applications, resumes, letters
and notes of reference, working papers, research materials, records, exami-
nations and any other documents or records and the information they con-
tain, solicited or prepared either by the applicant or the [government] for
use in the examination or evaluation of applicants for positions as [govern-
ment] employees.
(1) Notwithstanding any confidentiality provision other than this [para-
graph], applications, resumes, and letters and notes of reference, other than
those letters and notes of reference expressly submitted in confidence, per-
taining to the applicant hired are public records after the applicant is hired.
(2) Telephone numbers are not public records if they are designated as
"unlisted" or "unpublished" in an application, resume or letter or note of
reference.
Mx. RaV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7070(1) (Supp. 1989-1990); tit. 30-A, §§ 503(1) and
2702(1) (Supp. 1989-1990).
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vided information is not a new issue,""6 it has received much recent
attention from the press, the courts and the Legislature.
The Bangor Daily News, in Bangor Publishing Co. v. City of Ban-
gor, 1 57 initiated the applicant-information frenzy in 1988 with its re-
quest to the City of Bangor for the names and addresses of unsuc-
cessful applicants for the job of chief of police. The City argued that
the sources of the information sought, applications and resumes,
were exempt from disclosure because they were statutorily confiden-
tial as "working papers, research materials, records and the exami-
nations prepared for and used specifically in the examination or
evaluation of applicants for employment by that municipality." s
The Law Court rejected this argument, noting that the confidential-
ity statute enumerates only employer-generated materials, "in es-
sence the municipality's own work product as opposed to documents
sent by applicants to enter themselves in the competitive applica-
tion process. '"159
The court's holding in Bangor Publishing in favor of disclosure
spawned L.D. 1328, "An Act Providing Confidentiality for Public
Sector Job Applicants," whose statement of fact cited the Law
Court's decision as the reason for this clarifying legislation.100 The
concern of the bill's sponsors was the court's affirmation of a no-
confidentiality-status of applications and resumes, a deterrent to
"well qualified applicants who would otherwise apply for govern-
ment positions. 1 61 Thus, after no fewer than four amendments, the
bill was enacted to grant confidentiality to both applicant and gov-
ernment-generated materials used in the "examination or evalua-
tion" of applicants for government positions. However, upon hiring,
an applicant's application, resume and letters and notes of reference
become public records and open to inspection.1 62 Telephone num-
156. See, e.g., Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (1961), reprinted in 1961-1962 Me. Att'y Gen.
Ann. Rep. 82-83 (applications, transcripts of high school and school of nursing, and
letters of reference furnished to the Maine State Board of Nursing are confidential);
Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (June 3, 1977) (applications and reference forms sent to the De-
partment of Education and Cultural Services are not public records if they are re-
ceived for use in a teacher placement clearinghouse as opposed to use by local school
districts for the hiring process).
157. 544 A.2d 733 (Me. 1988).
158. MF. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2257 (1978), repealed and replaced by ME. Rnv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 2702(1) (Supp. 1989-1990)).
159. Bangor Publishing Co. v. City of Bangor, 544 A.2d at 736.
160. L.D. 1328, Statement of Fact (114th Legis. 1989).
161. Id. Emergency Preamble.
162. P.L. 1989, ch. 402, §§ 1-3. However, letters and notes of reference remain
confidential if they were expressly submitted in confidence.
The minority report of the judiciary committee attempted to make the materials of
applicants public records once they were interviewed for the job. Comm. Amend. B to
L.D. 1328, No. S-233 (114th Legis. 1989). One amendment even attempted to make
public the records of those applicants interviewed for "major policy-influencing posi-
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bers designated in such materials as "unlisted" or "unpublished" are
not public records." 3
Yet, while the Legislature's actions severely limit public scrutiny
of the way taxpayer-paid government employees are hired, it has not
deterred the enthusiasm of the press: less than four months later,
Guy Gannett Publishing Co. was in superior court unsuccessfully
seeking access to applications for the position of superintendent of
the Falmouth school system.""
Confidentiality statutes extend beyond the public employment
arena, creating further public-access-versus-privacy issues, although
not as many find their way to the courts. One such issue, whether an
adopted child may gain access, from the Department of Human Ser-
vices, to the identity of her putative father, did make it to the Law
Court. In Rossignol v. Commissioner of Human Services,105 the
plaintiff, nearly forty years after she was placed for adoption
through the Department, identified her natural mother through files
located at the Kennebec County Probate Court."0 " Unable to iden-
tify her father, she sought access to the Department's records under
the Freedom of Access Act. The Department denied the request on
confidentiality grounds, pursuant to statute: "All department
records which contain personally identifying information and are
created or obtained in connection with the department's child pro-
tective activities and activities related to a child while in the care
or custody of the department are confidential . ." 7 Both the
superior court and the Law Court, without mention of the narrow
construction normally given to exceptions, upheld the Department's
denial based on the plaintiff's statutory "care or custody" status for
the first two years of her life.
tions." Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 1328, No. S-256 (114th Legis. 1989).
163. P.L. 1989, ch. 402, §§ 1-3.
164. Guy Gannett Publishing Co. v. Falmouth School Dept., No. CV-89-553 (Me.
Super. Ct., Cum. Cty., Oct. 13, 1989). The court ruled that the school department was
correct in denying access to the applications, since they were confidential under hm.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6101 (1983), the statute applicable to school employee3.
This statute, the court noted, protects "all information" used in hiring, including the
school department's work product and information submitted by the applicants. Id.
at 4. Therefore, the school records statute was clearly distinct from the narrower mu-
nicipal employees statute in Bangor Publishing, which protected only the city's
materials and not all information used in evaluating applicants. Id. at 4-5.
165. 495 A.2d 788 (Me. 1985).
166. Id. at 789. The plaintiff apparently learned that her natural mother gave the
Department, at about the same time that she surrendered her child, information
identifying the probable father, who was not believed to be her mother's husband. Id.
167. MF REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4008(1) (Supp. 1989-1990) (emphasis added).
However, the Department did release sketchy information to the plaintiff about her
father without identifying him "unmarried, one of several brothers and sister, a
large, husky man with dark hair who appeared to be physically well and 'smart."'
Rossignol v. Commissioner of Human Services, 495 A.2d at 790.
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Conversely, two years ago the Law Court ruled that a plaintiff's
request for documents relating to her application to the Home En-
ergy Assistance Program, otherwise confidential, "are not confiden-
tial as to her on her own demand that [the Division of Community
Services] produce them."' 8 The controlling statute here, however,
expressly provides that any person protected by the confidentiality
provision has a right to waive that status in writing.0 9
Although the issue of privacy is broader than this Comment can
accommodate, privacy acts warrant mention-even though Maine
does not have one-because they are often confused with freedom of
information acts. While the latter are broad access statutes and can
be employed by any person for purposes of obtaining any informa-
tion deemed a public record, privacy acts permit access only to per-
sonal records in the custody of the government. A requester under a
privacy act, such as the federal Privacy Act of 1974, must be the
subject of the record or the subject's legal guardian. 170
In an attempt to implement a Maine privacy law similar to the
federal one, the Joint Standing Committee on Legal Affairs was di-
rected in 1975 to conduct a study of record-keeping practices of
public and private agencies and their effects on individuals' pri-
vacy.' 7 ' In its final report, the committee concluded that the results
of its questionnaire to state agencies and its meetings with depart-
ment heads, the Maine Civil Liberties Union and others "did not
justify . . . extensive and detailed [privacy] legislation at this
time.'17 2 Although the committee noted that "[tihe potential for
harm to individual rights exists even in as small and rural a state as
Maine," it apparently relied heavily on the existing confidentiality
statutes to protect the privacy of Maine citizens.17 3
168. Alexander v. Division of Community Services, 556 A.2d 222, 223 (Me. 1989).
169. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3523(3) (1989).
170. The federal Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (1977), enacted only a few
months after the federal FOIA amendments, was intended to prevent, among other
things, secret record-keeping on United States citizens. Thus, under the Act, subjects
of government records can request amendment of any records that are not "accurate,
relevant, timely, or complete." Id. at § 552a (d)(2)(B)(i). For an excellent guide on
how information can be accessed using these two acts at the federal level, see C.
MAmKwic. YouR RIGHr TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION (1985).
171. The committee was directed by H.P. 1597 (1975), a joint order, to report the
results of its study, along with recommendations and proposed legislation to the next
session of the Legislature. The order cited the growing use of computers, extensive
record-keeping, sales of mailing lists, and the practice of denying individuals the right
to see or correct their own records as reasons for the study. Id.
172. JOINT STANDING CoMMIrrrz ON LEGAL AFFAIRS, REPORT ON RECORD-KEEPING
AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY, at 6 (1977) [hereinafter REPORT ON RECORD-KEEPING].
However, the committee did introduce a bill, enacted in 1975, that allowed state,
county, municipal, and private employees (or former employees) to review their per-
sonnel files. P.L. 1975, ch. 694.
173. REPORT ON RECORD-KEEPING, supra note 172, at 4, 6. See also Op. Me. Att'y
Gen. 82-46 (Department of Mental Health advocate's report that includes informa-
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What is not clear in Maine, even after Gannett Publishing, Ban-
gor Publishing, and Rossignol, is whether the statutorily created
confidential exemptions are permissive or mandatory in nature. In
other words, there is no indication whether the agency or public offi-
cial with custody of such confidential information has any discretion
in disclosure or nondisclosure. This vagueness derives from the "ex-
cept" language that precedes the exemptions, as well as a general
lack of legislative history and case law in Maine.
Some state legislatures have clearly indicated the nature of their
public records exemptions in order to provide guidance to agen-
cies.1 7 4 As for the federal FOLA, it was the United States Supreme
Court, in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,175 that held exemptions are per-
missive rather than mandatory. Thus, exemptions under the federal
law, unless a statute clearly removes all discretion, serve as mere
license to agencies to refuse disclosure if they so choose. On the
other hand, an agency may determine that disclosure is proper.
Despite a lack of legislative guidance, Maine's attorney general, in
an opinion to the Commissioner of the Department of Educational
and Cultural Services, boldly ventured into the issue."70 The opinion
analyzed the "complaints, charges or accusations" exception of the
Civil Service Law, the same one addressed in Gannett Publishing,77
and advised that the confidentiality status was only permissive.178
According to the attorney general, therefore, the custodian of the
tion about a client is confidential under the former M. Rxv. STAT. ANr. tit. 34, § 1-B
(1978), which was "intended as a broad exception to the general rule of freedom of
access.").
174. E.g., N.Y. Pun. OFF. LAw § 87(2) (McKinney 1988) ("such agency may deny
access to records or portions thereof. . .") (emphasis added). Other states expre:Aly
mandate confidentiality. See, e.g., Ky. RIL. STAT. ANN. § 61.878(1) (1986) ("shall be
subject to inspection only upon order of a court.. ."); ILL AmN STAT. ch. 116, para.
207 (Smith-Hurd 1988) ("The following shall be exempt from inspection and copying
.") (emphasis added).
175. 441 U.S. 281, 290-94 (1979).
176. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 82-42. In another opinion, the attorney general advisd
that the state auditor, in his discretion, may keep confidential "to some extent re-
ports containing evidences of improper or incompetent financial administration." Op.
Me. Att'y Gen. 2 (July 31, 1978). Otherwise, reports of the Department of Audit are
public records. Id.
177. At the time of the attorney general opinion on this matter, however, the law
was codified as M Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 551 (1964) and was titled the "Maine
Personnel Law."
178. The attorney general's analysis applies to "declared confidential by statute"
exceptions and not to the substantive exceptions to 402(3), which are clearly permis-
sive in nature. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 82-42, 9 n.10. However, the attorney general cau-
tioned that its analysis applied only to confidentiality statutes where legislative inten-
tion as to permissive or mandatory was absent. Id. at 10. See eg., Dunn & Theobald,
Inc. v. Cohen, 402 A.2d 603, 605-606 (Me. 1979) ("We have some doubt whether the
Attorney General could waive the confidential status of investigative reports in the
face of the legislative mandate.").
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confidential records determines whether information may be kept
confidential, but only after conducting a three-part inquiry "to as-
certain whether such disclosure would be incompatible with one of
the evident purposes" of the confidentiality statute.179 The inquiry
focuses on the three groups the Legislature apparently intended to
protect: those who are the subject of the "complaints, charges or ac-
cusations of misconduct"; those who make such charges; and those
who might be the victims of the alleged misconduct.180 Applying the
three-pronged analysis to the information in question, a Department
of Education report regarding the alleged physical and sexual abuse
of students at the Baxter School for the Deaf, it was the opinion of
the the attorney general that disclosure was permitted in the discre-
tion of the Department. Although disclosure posed a potential ad-
verse effect on the victims, the opinion advised that their identities
could be protected by deleting their names.181 Crucial to the opinion
was the oft-repeated principle that the Legislature intended public
scrutiny of the results of an agency's policy decisions: "To find oth-
erwise would be to read so much into the word 'misconduct' as to
seriously negate the overall purpose of the Freedom of Access Law,
which is to insure that such scrutiny is possible.'
8 2
Although the Law Court has not directly addressed the permis-
sive-mandatory question as to exemptions, it has held that statuto-
rily confidential information must be provided to the courts and to
special legislative investigatory committees. In Maine Sugar Indus-
tries v. Maine Industrial Building Authority,8 3 two corporations
doing business in Maine, both with substantial loans guaranteed by
the defendant Authority, sought a so-called reverse-FOIA declara-
tory judgment and injunctive relief prohibiting disclosure of infor-
mation it had previously submitted to the Authority. This informa-
179. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 82-42, at 11.
180. Id. at 10.
181. This opinion dealt only with disclosure of Section XII(B), a sensitive seg-
ment of a Department of Education report, which evaluated the role of the Depart-
ment in responding to the charges at the Baxter School. Id. at 1. The rest of the
report had been publicly released on July 14, 1982, about four weeks before this opin-
ion was issued. Thus, the attorney general's analysis found that the July 12, 1982,
release of its own report on the matter and the attendant press coverage had tem-
pered any possible adverse effects on those charged and on those who brought
charges of misconduct. Id. at 11.
A follow-up opinion was issued one week later, on August 25, 1982, in response to
the Department's submission of additional information that had not been disclosed in
the earlier Department report. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 82-44. As to the victims, the attor-
ney general advised that the names of those who were subjects of complaints and of
those who made complaints be deleted, as well as certain other phrases in the report
that might reveal confidential information not previously released. Op. Me. Att'y
Gen. 82-44, at 5-8.
182. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 82-42, at 10-11.
183. 264 A.2d 1 (Me. 1970).
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tion was requested by a special interim legislative committee, which
had been furnished with subpoena power and had been established
to investigate alleged questionable loan applications and financial
problems of the plaintiff corporations.18 4 The corporations brought
suit in order to prevent disclosure of records they contended were
confidential by statute. The statute forbade any Authority employee
from divulging information supplied by a mortgagee. 85
The court held that this secrecy statute must be construed as
prohibiting voluntary disclosure by the agency, but not when re-
quested by a court of competent jurisdiction or by a special interim
legislative investigating committee. 8" Despite the potential injury
that disclosure might create for the corporations, the court's balanc-
ing analysis favored disclosure: the risk is "outweighed by the public
interest in having the Legislature fully informed as to matters which
involve the use of public funds and the credit of the State. .. ."
Another "confidential by statute" category, seldom litigated in
Maine, involves investigative records of law enforcement officers and
agencies. In Dunn & Theobald, Inc. v. Cohen,'88 the plaintiffs
sought access, under the FOAA, to investigative records of the attor-
ney general. They hoped to use this information in a libel suit com-
menced against the Bangor Daily News, which had published a story
concerning the events covered in the attorney general's investiga-
tion.189 The attorney general denied access based on statutory confi-
184. Id. at 3-4.
185. MF Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 852 (1980) ("No member of the authority...
shall divulge or disclose any information obtained from the records and file3... in
support of an application for mortgage insurance."). However, this statute was
amended by P.L 1969, ch. 584, § 1 ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prohibit the disclosure of information.. .to a special interim legislative inve3tigating
committee .... "), which was to become effective May 9,1970, almost six weeks after
the Law Court issued its opinion.
The Law Court interpreted both versions of the statute as requiring disclosure to a
legislative investigative committee. Maine Sugar Indus., Inc. v. Maine Indus. Bldg.
Auth., 264 A.2d at 6.
186. Maine Sugar Indus., Inc. v. Maine Indu& Bldg. Auth, 24 A.2d at 6.
187. Id. The attorney general's office, relying heavily on Maine Sugar Industries,
has directed that otherwise confidential records be disclosed to the state auditor of
Maine Guaranty Authority files, Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (July 10, 1978), and to court
proceedings requiring examination of Employment Security Commission records, Op.
Me. Att'y Gen. (April 21, 1977).
But see Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 80-59, 3 where the attorney general ruled that a Public
Utilities commissioner was not permitted to reveal confidential personnel information
at a public hearing, pursuant to M. Rv. STAT. A.. tit. 5, § 554 (1964) (governmen-
tal employee confidentiality). Moreover, although the Legislature as a whole has in-
vestigatory powers, its committees do not, unless granted such powers by the Legisla-
ture, pursuant to Am Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 401 (1989). Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 80-59,
at 4.
188. 402 A.2d 603 (Me. 1979).
189. Id. at 604.
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dentiality: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all com-
plaints and investigative records of the Department of the Attorney
General shall be and are declared to be confidential."'190
Relying on the "notwithstanding" preface to the statute, the Law
Court rejected this as an FOAA case, thereby disposing of the strict-
construction-of-exceptions principle. Rather, it upheld the denial of
access to attorney general investigative records by "considering the
meaning of. . .this remedial legislation broadly in accordance with
the fair and ordinary meaning of its language." 19 ' Furthermore, the
attorney general's report to a state senator regarding results of the
investigation did not waive the confidentiality status of the
records.192
Police departments, custodians of the vast majority of investiga-
tive records, have been only obliquely referred to with regard to the
FOAA. In an opinion regarding the public's access to names of per-
sons holding license plate numbers, the attorney general advised
that municipal and state police departments must disclose such in-
formation in their "possession or custody." 9 3 Furthermore, the only
exception to disclosure would be the "very unique case" in which
the identity of a motor vehicle registrant alone constitutes "investi-
gative information.'
94
190. Mx. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 200-D (1989). This confidentiality provision be-
came effective April 1, 1976, nearly two years after the attorney general conducted its
investigation against plaintiffs. Dunn & Theobald, Inc. v. Cohen, 402 A.2d at 604.
The Law Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that employing the new provision
would be impermissible retroactive application: "By its language it was concerned
with any and all of the Attorney General's investigative records, whenever created
." Id. at 605.
191. Dunn & Theobald v. Cohen, 402 A.2d at 605. A superior court's more recent
analysis of the same statute reached the same result. In Ricci v. Bernstein, Shur,
Sawyer & Nelson, No. CV-84-1310 (Me. Super. Ct., Cum. Cty., Nov. 14, 1988), the
attorney general was granted his motion to quash subpoenas directed to him and
others regarding an investigation conducted in connection with events involved in
this superior court case and other suits against the defendant law firm. Noting that
the Legislature "chose not to provide for court ordered access to the attorney gen-
eral's investigative files," the court denied the plaintiff's subpoena request. Id. at 2.
192. Dunn & Theobald v. Cohen, 402 A.2d at 605-606. The court reached this
conclusion for two reasons: an attorney general cannot waive the confidentiality of its
investigations in light of the legislative mandate, and the attorney general could not
waive a right that was not to be created for another two years. Id.
193. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 80-93. The opinion relied on M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29,
§ 57 (1978), makes all records of the Secretary of State regarding motor vehicle regis-
tration and licenses open to public inspection. Id. at 3-4. Accordingly, the attorney
general opined that the same records in the possession of the police must also be
accessible to the public. Id. Moreover, the statutory confidentiality accorded "all
criminal and administrative records of the State Police," under ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 25, § 1631, was not meant to encompass records already opened to the public
through another state agency. Id.
194. Id. at 4. The exception is based on title 16, section 614 of the Maine Revised
Statutes which provides that "records in the custody of a local, county or district
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A final statutory exception to the public records definition is trade
secrets and commercial information. Although nearly one-third of
the states expressly exempt this information in their freedom of in-
formation acts, 195 Maine has a handful of separate statutes prohibit-
ing such disclosure "96 and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.10 One
such statute, pertaining to agricultural market research and devel-
opment grants, provides confidentiality to information which the
Department of Agriculture has determined "gives the person making
the request opportunity to obtain business or competitive advantage
over another person who does not have access to the information or
will result in loss. .. ."198
However, it is not clear how specifically an agency must define the
"business advantage" or resulting "loss" before it can deny access to
such information in its custody.1 9  The only guidance in the area of
commercial information, an attorney general ruling to the State De-
velopment Office, provides that the information is exempt from the
"public records" definition if it can be demonstrated that "it has
been carefully guarded by the company as a part of its business op-
erations."200 Yet, the attorney general cautioned that any informa-
tion in the "public domain" is almost never eligible for nondisclo-
sure, unless it can be used "to reconstruct confidential business
criminal justice agency containing intelligence and investigative information shall be
confidential" if it meets one of seven criteria, including resulting in the public dis-
semination of prejudicial information regarding an accused. h. REv. STx. Aim tit.
16, § 614 (1983 & Supp. 1989-1990).
The issue of whether the federal government's original non-law-enforcement moti-
vation in gathering information precludes confidentiality status to those records once
the government converts them to law enforcement use was settled last year. The U.S.
Supreme Court dismissed the original intention argument and held that any record
"compiled for law enforcement purposes" was exempt from public disclosure under
the federal FOIA. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 110 S.Ct, 471, 476-77 (1989),
reh'g denied, 110 S.Ct. 884 (1989).
195. Braverman & Heppler, supra note 94, at 741.
196. See, e.g., MP_ REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1716(3) (1988) (manufacturer, im-
porter, distributor or employer may withhold chemical identity of hazardous chemical
on a material safety data sheet); tit. 7, § 401-D(5) (1989) (information relative to
agricultural market research or development activities provided to Department of Ag-
riculture prior to formal application is confidential); tit. 12 § 7369(7)(C) (Supp. 1990-
1991) (financial information submitted to Department of Conservation by commercial
whitewater outfitter is confidential).
197. M REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1542 (4)(A) & (B) (Supp. 1989-1990) (trade
secret is a formula, pattern or process that "derives independent economic value...
from not being generally known" and "[i]s the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy").
198. MP REv. STAT. ANN. tit 7, § 401-D(5)(B) (1989).
199. Cf. Tex. Att'y Gen. Open Records Decision No. 124 (1976) (an agency's mere
allegation that an unknown competitor might gain some unspecified advantage is not
enough to prevent disclosure).
200. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 5 (Sept. 2, 1976).
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information. '20 - The presence of any such confidential commercial
information commingled with public information is not grounds for
nondisclosure; the agency should delete protected portions and dis-
close the remainder.20 2
(ii.) Section 402(3)(B): Records Within the Scope of Privilege
Against Discovery or Use as Evidence
Of the six substantive exceptions available to agencies and public
officials in denying public inspection of requested information,
402(3)(B) appears to be most often invoked. Determination of
whether records fall within this exception is made by inquiry into its
inadmissibility as evidence in a court proceeding. It is, therefore, an
exception often litigated and often the subject of attorney general
opinions.
The Law Court first dealt with the privileged material grounds for
denial in Moffett v. City of Portland,20 3 in which plaintiff city police
officers sought to enjoin the city, city manager, and chief of police
from disclosing transcripts of eight officers' statements made during
an internal police investigation. The injunctions were sought after
summaries of interviews with the police officers were released to the
press. When the full transcripts were requested by Guy Gannett
Publishing, the city attorney agreed to public inspection under the
Freedom of Access Act pending an opportunity for the officers to
challenge the disclosure. The Law Court agreed with the officers' ar-
gument that the statements arising from the investigation, made
under threat of "disciplinary action," were protected by the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination and upheld the con-
fidentiality status of the information. 20 Despite the principle of
strict construction of the Act's exceptions, the court was compelled
to abide by the "plain and ordinary meaning of the words selected
by the Legislature to define what are not to be 'public records.' "200
The University of Maine, in Guy Gannett Publishing Co. v. Uni-
versity of Maine,"'2 also attempted to deny disclosure of its settle-
ment with the basketball coach on 402(3)(B) grounds. It argued that
the settlement agreement enjoyed privilege status pursuant to Rule
408(a) of the Maine Rules of Evidence, which prevents admissibility
of settlements to prove liability, and therefore was exempt from
201. Id. (citing Fisher v. Renegotiation Board, 473 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1972), on
remand, 355 F. Supp. 1171 (D.C. D.C. 1973)).
202. Id. (citing Fisher v. Renegotiation Board, 355 F. Supp. at 1174, and Grum.
man Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board, 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir.
1970)).
203. 400 A.2d 340 (Me. 1979).
204. Id. at 344-45.
205. Id. at 348. For a discussion of other aspects of this case, see supra notes 49,
52 and accompanying text.
206. 555 A.2d 470, 472-73 (Me. 1979).
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public disclosure under 402(3)(B). 20 7 The Law Court, holding that
the agreement was subject to public inspection, rejected the argu-
ment on two grounds. First, it noted that Rule 408(a) pertained to
relevancy and not to the creation of privileges. Second, the rule's bar
to admissibility, applying only to "substantive issues in dispute be-
tween the parties to the agreement," was inapplicable here since the
settlement was between the University and the coach, parties who
were not in dispute.203 The real dispute, between the publishing
company and the University, was not affected by Rule 408. Hence,
the evidence exception argument failed: "the public has a right to
know the terms upon which a public employer has settled with a
resigning contract employee. ' '2 0 9
Yet another inquiry as to the confidentiality of settlements also
resulted in disclosure. This inquiry was directed to the attorney gen-
eral and concerned the status of conciliation agreements settled
under the aegis of the Maine Human Rights Commission, whose
proceedings operate according to a statute seemingly in conflict with
the FOAA.210 Analogous to Rule 408 of the Maine Rules of Evi-
dence, the statute forbids disclosure, without the parties' consent, of
information generated during conciliatory proceedings.21' Like Rule
408 of the Maine Rules of Evidence, the purpose of the statute is to
"promote 'free and open discussion in negotiations for settle-
ment.' 1212 However, the attorney general ruled that the statute does
207. M.IR Evid. 408(a) states:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) ac-
cepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in com-
promise or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to ei-
ther validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for, invalidity
of, or amount of the claim or any other claim. Evidence of conduct or state-
ments made in compromise negotiations is also not admissible on any sub-
stantive issue in dispute between the parties.
208. Guy Gannett Publishing Co. v. University of Maine, 555 A.2d at 472.
209. Id. at 473. Another newspaper's request for access to a settlement, this time
between a suspended police officer and the town of Camden, again resulted in disclo-
sure, but the town's argument here was based on a statutory exemption other than
section 402(3)(B). Bangor Publishing Co. v. Town of Camden, No. CV-8&163 (Knox
Cty., Dec. 12, 1988).
210. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (May 10, 1977).
211. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4612(3) (1989) provides
If the [Human Rights] commission finds reasonable grounds to believe that
unlawful discrimination has occurred ... it shall endeavor to eliminate
such discrimination by informal means such as conference, conciliation and
persuasion. Nothing said or done as part of such endeavors may be made
public without the written consent of the parties to the proceeding, nor
used as evidence in any subsequent proceeding, civil or criminal.. . . If the
case is disposed of by such informal means in a manner satisfactory to a
majority of the commission, it shall dismiss the proceeding.
212. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 2 (May 10, 1977) (quoting R. FImLD & P. MURRAY. MAINE
EVIDENCE, § 408.1 (1976) (emphasis added)).
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not prevent public access to the final terms of a conciliation
agreement.
2 13
Because the privilege exemption of section 402(3)(B) is as broad
as the scope of "any evidentiary privilege recognized in the courts of
Maine,"2 14 it is inevitable that several such arguments are attempted
and do succeed in precluding disclosure of certain information. In
Marquis v. City of Lewiston,21 5 the plaintiff successfully appealed to
the superior court to obtain access to a state police reconstruction
report of an accident involving the plaintiff and a city police cruiser.
However, the court denied her access to the written communications
between the city and its attorney, finding that such correspondence
was privileged under the work product rule, Rule 26(b)(3) of the
Maine Rules of Civil Procedure.
21 6
Finally, an evidentiary privilege of great concern to agencies is the
"informer privilege," Rule 509 of the Maine Rules of Evidence,
which implicates citizens who make complaints regarding alleged vi-
olations of law. The rule provides confidentiality of the identity of
persons who furnish such information and the privilege extends to
representatives of public entities to which the information was
provided."
The attorney general, in response to several agency requests, clari-
fied that, although the rules of evidence preempt laws with which
they conflict, no conflict exists between the informer privilege and
the public records definition.2 " Accordingly, "[iun the spirit of" the
public records definition, the written records of complaints must be
open to public inspection; however, the identity of the source of the
complaint may be withheld.
21 9
C. Section 403: Meetings to be Open to Public
While most states had constitutional provisions for qualified ac-
cess to legislative proceedings,2 20 as early as 1944, Maine had a stat-
213. Id.
214. Moffett v. City of Portland, 400 A.2d 340, 346 (Me. 1979).
215. Nos. CV-88-358; 88-513 (Me. Super. Ct., And. Cty., July 19, 1989).
216. "Reports prepared in the ordinary course of business are not protected by
work product qualified immunity." Id. at 2 (citing 4 J. MOORE, MOORE's FED. PRAC-
TICE, § 26-354).
217. M.R. Evid. provides:
(a) Rule of Privilege. The United States, a state or subdivision
thereof, or any foreign country has a privilege to refuse to disclose the iden-
tity of a person who has furnished information relating to or assisting in an
investigation of a possible violation of a law to a law enforcement officer or
member of a legislative committee or its staff conducting an investigation.
(b) Who May Claim. The privilege may be claimed by an appropriate
representative of the public entity to which the information was furnished.
218. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 2 (Sept. 29, 1975).
219. Id. at 1, 3.
220. In 1953, 33 states had constitutional provisions for access. CROSS, supra note
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ute which granted near absolute access to the proceedings of the
Legislature, albeit only to the press: "Representatives of the Press
who shall be actually engaged in sending daily reports of the doings
of the legislature ... [shall] have the privilege of the floor of the
senate and house of representatives ... ."221 Thus, for government
to be open even to the press at the local level depended upon the
existence of ordinances.
The special privilege created for the press was greatly expanded
by the 1959 original right-to-know statute, which granted the right
to attend public meetings at all levels of government to "all per-
sons."222 This 1959 statutory provision was the basis for the current
law-
Except as otherwise provided by statute or by section 405, all
public proceedings shall be open to the public, any person shall be
permitted to attend any public proceeding and any record or min-
utes of such proceedings that is required by law shall be made
promptly and shall be open to public inspection.3
"Open to the public" means that entities within the ambit of the
public proceedings definition of section 402(2) must abide by the
spirit of the FOAA and conduct their transactions openly, from de-
liberation to final approval. 22' One attorney general opinion, for ex-
ample, ruled that decisions reached during telephone meetings by a
board of county commissioners, and later approved at its next regu-
larly scheduled meeting, was antithetical to the FOAA.2 5 Here, the
board was engaged in budgetary decision-making, a public proceed-
ing within the meaning of section 402(2); therefore, such action must
be taken publicly, complete with notice to the public of the time and
place.226
Just as telephone meetings are prohibited, so are "meetings" by
correspondence. The attorney general confronted a situation where
the chairman of the Commission of Governmental Ethics and Elec-
tion Practices mailed to fellow members his draft of an advisory
5, at 183-84.
The common limitations to access are similar to New York's: "when the public
welfare shall require secrecy .... N.Y. CoNsT., art. MI, § 10.
221. R.S. ch. 9, §§ 9, 10 (1944).
222. P.L. 1959, ch. 219, § 38.
223. M. Ray. STAT. Am. tit. 1, § 403 (1989).
224. Section 405, however, does allow executive sessions for specified purposes.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 §§ 402(2), 405 (1989). See infra notes 245-71 and accompa-
nying text for a detailed discussion of the executive sessions provision.
225. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 79-126, 4 ("The underlying purpose of the Freedom of
Access Law is to permit and encourage the citizens of this State to attend those meet-
ings at which the public's business will be discussed and to provide an opportunity
for them to present their views.. ."). Id. at 5.
226. Id. at 3.
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opinion.227 This was followed up with a telephone poll of the mem-
bers as to whether they agreed with the letter. The advisory opinion
was adopted, but no meeting was ever held. As a result of its non-
compliance with the Act, the attorney general ruled that the Com-
mission's advisory opinion was invalid, as if one had never been
issued. 228
In addition to the limitations imposed by the "public proceed-
ings" definition, the broad nature of the open meetings section is
wholly dependent upon statutory exceptions, including the Act's
own substantive exemption for executive sessions, which ultimately
determine what meetings the public may attend. Foremost among
the statutory exceptions is the exclusion of the public from certain
judicial proceedings. The concept of a public trial, with roots deep
in the common law of England, 229 manifested itself in this country in
the sixth amendment's right to a public trial in criminal cases, as
well as in the constitutions of almost every state, including Maine.2 80
Indeed, the Law Court vigorously reaffirmed this right in Maine
nearly 100 years ago:
It is an undeniable proposition, to start with in this discussion,
that courts of justice should be open to the public. That is the rule.
History brings us too vivid pictures of the oppressions endured by
our English ancestors at the hands of arbitrary courts ever to sat-
isfy the people of this country with courts whose doors are closed
against them. They instinctively believe that it is their right to wit-
ness trials and proceedings in the courts.281
More recently, in a line of cases beginning with Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia,22 the Supreme Court held that the public
227. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 84-25, 1.
228. Id. at 5.
229. As early as 1612, Lord Coke wrote about the "great importance" in ensuring
that "all causes ought be heard, ordered, and determined before the judges of the
kings courts openly ... ." CoKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS
Or ENGLAND 103 (1797).
Lt. Col. John Lilburne's plea at his trial in 1649 for high treason includes an argu-
ment for an open hearing:
I have something to say to the court about the first
fundamental liberty of an Englishman in order to his trial; which
is, That by the laws of this land all courts of justice always ought to be free
and open for all sorts of peaceable people to see, behold and hear, and have
free access unto ... and yet, Sir, as I came in, I found the gates shut and
guarded, which is contrary both to law and justice.
Trial of Lieutenant-Colonel John Lilburne, 4 Corbett's St. Tr. 1270, 1273 (Commis-
sion of Oyer & Terminer, England, 1649), quoted in H. CROSS, supra note 5, at 165.
230. MR CONsT. art. I, § 6.
231. Williamson v. Lacy, 86 Me. 80, 82-83, 29 A. 943, 944 (1893), cited in H.
CROSS, supra note 5, at 156.
232. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). The progeny of Richmond Newspapers are: Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (first amendment right of ac-
cess to sex offense trials during the testimony of minor victims); Press-Enterprise Co.
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and press have a right under the first amendment to attend criminal
trials.
Despite forceful justifications for open judicial proceedings,m as
well as constitutional, statutory and common law provisions, access
to the courts by the public is not absolute. Maine's Legislature has
adopted three categories of statutory limitations to the broad rule of
openness: divorce and custody proceedings;2M most juvenile pro-
ceedings;2 5 and the exclusion of minors as spectators at certain judi-
cial proceedings.2 36
As to the public's right to attend governmental meetings other
than judicial proceedings, there are statutes outside the Act that
regulate whether an entity's meetings are open: confirmation hear-
ings of judicial officers,237 legislative committee hearings, and the
taking of testimony during legislative investigating committee
hearings. 39
In conclusion, a person in Maine who wishes to attend govern-
mental meetings must first determine the applicability of the "pub-
lic proceedings" definition of section 402(2) and then consider the
statutory exceptions to the seemingly broad right to access given in
section 403.
D. Section 404: Recorded or Live Broadcasts Authorized
Section 404 was added in 1969, 0 ten years after the statute was
v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (first amendment right of access to voir dire
proceedings of potential jurors); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1
(1986) (first amendment right of access to pretrial criminal proceedings).
233. For a historical look at the justifications for open criminal proceedings, from
deterrence of judicial abuse to public awareness. See D. O'BRmN, THE Pumc's RIGHT
To KNow 125-49 (1981).
See also 6 J. WIGMORa. EvIDENCE IN TRIALS AT CosiMoN LAW § 1834 at 438
(Chadboum rev. ed. 1976). A higher quality of testimony is the effect of publicity.
First, it discourages witnesses from falsifying by "inducing the fear of disclosure."
Second, it puts on notice those possible witnesses who would otherwise go unknown
to the parties. Furthermore, there are reasons beyond evidentiary grounds: (1) officers
of the court are "strongly moved to a strict conscientiousness in the performance of
duty," thereby creating fewer abuses than likely in a secret proceeding; (2) persons
who are not directly involved in a proceeding may somehow be implicated and should
have the opportunity to protect themselves if so affected; and (3) respect for the law
grows and "a strong confidence in judicial remedies is secured which could never be
inspired by a system of secrecy.").
234. Ma. Rzv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 695 (Supp. 1989).
235. MF_ REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3307(2) (Supp. 1989).
236. Mn. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1401 (1989).
237. M. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 151 (1989).
238. Mn. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 165(3) (1989) ("A committee may hold either
public or private hearings and may hold executive sessions...").
239. Mlp. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 427 (1989) (all testimony shall be taken in open
session unless a witness requests otherwise).
240. P.L. 1969, ch. 293.
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first enacted. This section, only slightly modified since its incep-
tion,"i permits all persons to not only attend public proceedings but
to "make written, taped or filmed records of the proceedings, or to
live broadcast the same," as long as it does not interfere with the
"orderly conduct of the proceedings."2 42 Furthermore, the entity
may formulate rules and regulations regarding the taping or filming
of its proceedings, as long as they are "reasonable" and do not "de-
feat the purpose of this subchapter. '24 s Despite the perceived vic-
tory gained by the proponents of the FOAA with the addition of
section 404, no Maine case law exists pertaining to the taping, film-
ing or live broadcasting of public proceedings."'
E. Section 405: Executive Sessions
Were it not for this provision, the entire FOAA may never have
been enacted in 1959, according to a chief lobbyist for the statute,
because it was the executive sessions' rein on absolute accessibility
to governmental meetings that enticed legislators to adopt the rest
of the Act's more liberal provisions.2 15 Yet, despite the attractive-
ness of executive sessions in 1959 to those leery of open government,
even that original provision did not grant license to cloak govern-
241. In 1975, a preface was added to the section: "In order to facilitate the public
policy so declared by the Legislature of opening the public's business to public scru-
tiny . . ." P.L. 1975, ch. 483, repealed and replaced by P.L. 1975, ch. 758.
242. Ma REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 404 (1989).
243. Id.
244. However, in 1988, 76-year-old John Smith was arrested and jailed for refus-
ing to stop tape recording the Town of Lyman's selectmen's meeting. Lyman Man
Jailed For Taping Meeting, Portland Press Herald, Apr. 23, 1988, at 1, 16. The York
County District Attorney later dropped the charge of violating ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17A, § 751, which provides that a person is guilty of obstructing government ad.
ministration "if he uses force, violence or intimidation or engages in any criminal act
with intent to interfere with a public servant performing... an official function."
DA Drops Charges Against Man Who Taped Selectman's Meeting, Portland Press
Herald, May 7, 1988, at 1, 20.
Smith, in turn, threatened to file suit against the Town and eventually settled for
$15,000, which he put in a trust fund: each year the York County college-bound high
school student who writes the best first amendment essay wins a $1,000 award, An
'Old Crank,' editorial, Portland Press Herald, Mar. 19, 1989, at 24A.
245. Taped interview with Professor Hamilton, chairman of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Committee that lobbied for the 1959 Act (1990) (on fie with author).
According to Hamilton, after a hearing on the original draft of the bill, written by
Harold Cross and Hamilton, the chairman of the Legislature's Judiciary Committee
warned that absence of an exective sessions provision "would make passage [of the
bill] tough." Cross then wrote a limited executive sessions provision that was ac-
cepted by the Legislature verbatim.
However, shortly after enactment, Hamilton viewed this executive sessions provi-
sion as one that the public and press could live with: "If this executive sessions provi-
sion is abused, I feel you will have only yourselves to blame, because adequate public-
ity will probably bring most any public group to heel." Memorandum to Maine Joint
Committee on Freedom of Information from Brooks Hamilton (May 7, 1959).
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mental decision-making in secrecy. The 1959 executive sessions sec-
tion required that (1) no ordinance, order, rule, resolution, regula-
tion, contract, appointment or any other official action could be
finally approved at executive sessions, (2) executive sessions could
be called only by a majority vote of the entity's members, and (3)
such sessions could not be used "to defeat the purposes" of the Act's
other provisions .2e However, the Legislature reserved the broadest
powers in calling executive sessions by exempting its own commit-
tees from the requirements of this section.
2 17
In 1975 this special treatment given to the Legislature was re-
pealed, and the conditions for executive sessions were drastically
tightened, creating many of the procedural features found in the
statute today.4 8 Consequently, a three-fifths vote, rather than a
simple majority vote, is required as is a motion detailing the "pre-
cise nature" of the business to be discussed in the executive ses-
sion.u 9 Moreover, "[n]o other matters may be considered in that
particular executive session. '25
0
The Legislature's 1975 fine-tuning of the substantive portions of
the executive sessions section were the last changes to date,21 leav-
ing only six areas of discussion permissible in executive sessions: (1)
discussion or consideration of almost every aspect of a civil servant's
employment if public discussion "could be reasonably expected to
cause damage to the reputation or the individual's right to privacy
would be violated," provided that the person charged or investigated
and the person bringing charges are allowed to attend;2 12 (2) discus-
sion or consideration by a school board of suspension or expulsion of
a public school student or a private school student, whose education
is paid from public -funds, provided that the student, his attorney
and his parents are permitted to attend;253 (3) discussion or consid-
eration of the condition, acquisition or use of property attached to
246. P.L. 1959, ch. 219 § 39.
247. Id. ("The conditions of this section shall not apply to executive sessions of
committees of the Maine Legislature.").
248. P.L. 1975, ch. 483.
249. MF. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 405(3), (4) (1989).
250. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 405(5) (1989). This "no-other-matters" language,
surviving a 1975 House amendment to repeal it by a 118 to 11 vote, was hailed by
proponents as necessary to curb the 1959 law which permitted executive sesions for
"virtually any purpose." 1 Legis. Rec. 1975, B-1122-23. Those who favored deleting
the "no-other-matters" language argued that the three-fifths vote and the motion re-
quirements were ample protection of the public's right to know. Id.
251. P.L. 1975, ch. 422, repealed and replaced by P.L. 1975, ch. 758 (codified at
Me. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 405 (1989)).
252. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 405(6)(A) (1989). However, any public employee
charged or investigated may request in writing that the meeting be open and the
agency must comply. Id. § 405(6)(A)(3). In addition, this section does not apply to
discussion of a budget or budget proposal Id. at § 405(6)(A).
253. Mx. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 405(6)(B) (1989).
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real property, or disposition of publicly held property or economic
development, only if "premature disclosures would prejudice" the
body's competitive or bargaining position;254 (4) discussions of labor
contracts and proposals and meetings between a public agency and
its negotiators, and negotiations between representatives of the
agency and public employees when both parties agree;2 5 (5) discus-
sions between a body and its attorney concerning the legal rights
and duties of the body or agency, pending or contemplated litiga-
tion, settlement offers and matters where the attorney's duty con-
flicts with the FOAA or where premature disclosure would "clearly
place the State, municipality or other public agency or person at a
substantial disadvantage; '26 and (6) discussions of information in
records deemed confidential by statute.2 57
The attorney general has issued several opinions regarding execu-
tive sessions, of which two in particular clearly respected the spirit
of the FOAA. In the first, the attorney general advised that while
the motion to go into executive session, specifying the topics to be
discussed, is a public record, the minutes and other records of these
closed sessions are not.2 58 Moreover, in the second opinion the attor-
ney general ruled that a governmental body cannot circumvent the
executive sessions requirements by holding a secret ballot during an
open session.259
But in its most flagrant interpretation of the executive sessions
provision, the attorney general ruled that the Legislature's Joint
Standing Committee on Energy and Natural Resources could con-
duct an executive session to discuss and consider the appointment
of a gubernatorial nominee as commissioner of conservation.2 0 De-
spite this dual-branch situation, where the legislative committee was
acting on an executive nomination, the opinion rejected section
402(6)(A)'s restriction that closed sessions are permissible for dis-
cussion or consideration of appointees "of the body or agency. '20 1
Instead, it formulated an alternate construction of the section,
whereby the purported public policy of maintaining civil servants'
privacy warrants closed meetings to discuss the appointment of a
nominee from a coordinate branch of government.2 2
254. Id. § 405(6)(C).
255. Id. § 405(6)(D).
256. Id. § 405(6)(E).
257. Id. § 405(6)(F).
258. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (June 9, 1978).
259. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 81-80. The only exception for this, according to the opin-
ion, is where a secret ballot is authorized by constitution or statute. Id. at 1, n.2.
260. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 79-99.
261. Id. at 1-2.
262. Id. at 2. The opinion also propounded a second justification for this result by
relying on section 405(6)(F), the provision that permits executive sessions for the dis-
cussion of records not open to the public. One such non-public record, legislators'
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The Law Court has also had some opportunities to interpret sec-
tion 405, but the plaintiffs in both cases were unsuccessful on proce-
dural grounds. In Bird v. Town of Old Orchard Beach,203 the plain-
tiff attempted to invalidate an action of the town council
authorizing a bond issue on the grounds that the actual decision was
made in executive session. This argument 2" failed for lack of proof
because the plaintiff was unable to contradict a council member's
supporting affidavit for the town that an ultimate decision was never
made in executive session.2 5 The Law Court, therefore, affirmed the
summary judgment for the town, but with the caveat that any deci-
sion deliberated and decided upon in secret executive session and
"perfunctorily enacted" in open session "would be illegal and sub-
ject to court order nullifying the same."' ma
In Colby v. York County Commissioners,2 7 the Law Court dis-
missed the plaintiff's complaint due to its untimely filing, nearly two
years after an alleged abuse of the executive sessions require-
ments.2 8 In this action, plaintiff, who had been discharged as a dep-
uty sheriff, sought reinstatement and back pay based on the county
commissioners' failure to hold a public hearing as he had requested
in writing.2" In addition, the plaintiff contended that he and his
lawyer were allowed to attend the closed session only during his own
testimony, a violation of section 405(6)(A)(2).2 7 Once again, how-
ever, the court alluded to the consequences for violation of the exec-
utive sessions provision if the appeal had been timely- "if error were
found the court could reverse, vacate, or modify the decision
working papers, are exempt from the public records definition in section 402(3)(C).
Therefore, according to the opinion, any such documents that legislators have regard-
ing the nomination of the commissioner could be discussed in closed sessions. Id. at 2.
But see Op. Mte. Att'y Gen. 2 (Apr. 6, 1977) (Milk Commission's meeting with its
independent milk expert could arguably violate expert's privacy or damage reputa-
tion if his work is found inadequate, but these arguments "are not strong and would
be likely to run afoul of a charge" that the executive session was used to defeat the
purpose of the FOAA).
263. 426 A.2d 370 (Me. 1981).
264. The primary argument made here by the plaintiff was that the board's deci-
sion was ultra vires due to the citizens' rejection of a nearly identical bond issue in an
earlier referendum. Id. at 371.
265. Id. at 376.
266. Id. at 375.
267. 442 A.2d 544 (Me. 1982).
268. For further discussion of the appeals time limit, see infra notes 306-17 and
accompanying text.
269. Id. at 545.
270. Review authorized by statute and review by extraordinary writ both afford
prompt and effective judicial review of administrative action, but "[w]hen direct re-
view is available pursuant to [MlR.Civ.P.] Rule 80B it is exclusive unless inade-
quate." Id. at 547. Here, the court found that plaintiff should have compelled a rec-
ord to be established under Rule 80B that would have served as the basis for judicial
review. Id. at 548.
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accordingly. ' 27 1
F. Section 406: Public Notice
The effectiveness of an act that requires meetings to be open to
the public but does not require public notice of those meetings is
questionable. Yet, for the first sixteen years of the FOAA's life,
there was no provision for public notice.
Finally enacted in 1975, the original section 406 provided:
Public notice shall be given for all public proceedings as defined in
section 402, if these proceedings are a meeting of a body or agency
consisting of 3 or more persons and the body or agency will deal
with the expenditure of public funds or taxation, or will adopt pol-
icy at the meeting. This notice shall be given in ample time to al-
low public attendance. In the event of an emergency meeting, local
representatives of the media shall be notified of the meeting, when-
ever practical, the notification to include time and location, by the
same or faster means used to notify the members of the agency
conducting the public proceeding.272
This provision has undergone only one change, an expansion in
1987, when the budget-and-taxation-only functions were eliminated,
mandating public notice of any meeting, regardless of the nature of
its transactions. 27 ' This deletion harmonizes the notice provision
and the public proceedings definition of "the transactions of any
functions." Moreover, a provision was added requiring that notice
"shall be disseminated in a manner reasonably calculated to notify
the general public in the jurisdiction served by the body or agency
concerned. '2 74
Although the public notice section is silent as to whether the sub-
ject matter of a meeting must be advertised in advance of the meet-
ing, the attorney general has ruled, in accord with the liberal man-
date and "obvious spirit" of the Act that an "agency would be well
advised to insure that its notice contains information adequate to
inform the public of the general subject matter of the meeting. 2 70
This does not mean, however, that an agency must prepare and dis-
seminate an agenda prior to a meeting. 70
The Law Court has had only one opportunity to rule on an alleged
violation of the Act's notice requirement. In Milos v. Northport Vil-
lage Corp.,77 the plaintiff sought appeal from a zoning board of ap-
peals action. Here, the court summarily dismissed this tertiary argu-
271. Id. at 548.
272. P.L. 1975, ch. 758, § 406.
273. P.L. 1987, ch. 477, § 4 (codified at M. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 406 (1989)).
274. Id.
275. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 81-80, at 3, 4.
276. Id. at 3.
277. 453 A.2d 1178 (Me. 1983).
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ment based on the plaintiffs failure to establish such violation.278
G. Section 407: Decisions
1. Section 407(1): Conditional Approval or Denial
Added fourteen years after the initial enactment of the FOAA in
1959, section 407(1) today directs governmental entities to make
written record of every decision involving the conditional approval
or denial of an application, license, certificate or any type of per-
mit.2 79 But this written record must state more than conclusory lan-
guage: it must state the reason for its decision and make written
findings of fact "sufficient to appraise [sic] the applicant and any
interested member of the public of the basis for the decision."Q0
Section 407, therefore, mandates agencies to make available to the
public what the Law Court deems necessary for effective judicial re-
view of administrative decisions. 28 1 In addition, this section provides
the plaintiff seeking judicial review of an agency decision with an
alternate argument upon which to base an appeal, namely insuffi-
cient findings. For example, in Shortill v. Inhabitants of the Town
of Buxton,28 2 the superior court remanded the case to the town's
planning board for further findings, pursuant to section 407(1).
However, the court noted that it was not necessary for the board to
make "extremely detailed findings," but that it must at least "at-
tempt... to answer the opposing arguments of the abutters and
state, at least briefly, why the arguments or points of (the defend-
ant] and not the plaintiffs were accepted. '2 3
2. Section 407(2): Dismissal or Refusal to Renew Contract
Enacted in 1975,284 section 407(2) provides that every agency deci-
sion involving dismissal or the refusal to renew the contract of any
public official, employee or appointee must be substantiated in writ-
ing. As in section 407(1), the record must contain justifications and
findings of fact sufficient to apprise the individual and any member
of the public of the basis of the decision. However, this provision
does not apply to probationary employees.2 5
278. Id. at 1180.
279. P.L. 1973, cl. 433, § 2 repealed and replaced by P.L. 1975, ch. 758 (codified
at A. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 407 (1989)).
280. Mr. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 407(1) (1989).
281. Harrington v. Inhabitants of Kennebunk, 459 A.2d 557, 562 (Me. 1983) ("We
reaffirm here that 'it is an indispensable prerequisite to effective judicial review that
an agency's decision set forth the findings of basic fact as well as the conclusions of
ultimate fact and conclusions of law derived therefrom.'") (quoting Gashgai v. Board
of Reg. in Medicine, 390 A.2d 1080, 1085 (Me. 1978)).
282. No. CV-85-584, 4 (Me. Super. Ct., Yor. Cty., Nov. 5, 1986).
283. Id. at 3.
284. P.L. 1975, cl. 758 (codified at Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 407 (1989)).
285. MFa REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 407(2) (1989).
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Yet, despite the opportunity sections 407(1) and (2) provide for
expanded public inspection, the absence of case law and attorney
general opinions suggests either that it is under-utilized by the pub-
lic or that agencies readily accede to such requests.
H. Section 408: Public Records Available for Public Inspection
The 1959 provision, since liberalized to include "every person,"380
granted the right of inspection only to "[e]very citizen of this State"
to inspect and copy all public records during regular business hours
of governmental bodies.28 7 Notwithstanding the original limitation
as to who could access public records, the enactment of the FOAA
represented a major stride beyond the common law, when the per-
son seeking inspection was required to have a proper purpose: "the
gratification of mere curiosity or motives merely speculative or the
creation of scandal will not entitle a person to inspection or to make
copies or memoranda. '288
The advancement of technology in governmental record-keeping
prompted legislative catch-up in 1975, with the addition of a provi-
sion regarding inspection of "mechanical or electronic data compila-
tions. '2s9 Whenever inspection of these materials requires transla-
tion, the requester "may be required to pay the State in advance for
the cost of translation" and may have to wait until that task does
not "delay or inconvenience" the agency or official.290 For example,
an agency might charge a requester for transcription of an audio
tape to be completed within a time convenient to that entity. How-
ever, whether a public record is translated or not, the cost of all
copying is borne by the requester.2 91
Although section 408 allows agencies to charge for the cost of cop-
ying and translation, it is silent as to how much a requester, whether
commercial or noncommercial, must pay for copies of public records.
Apparently, the agency has full discretion to collect any amount,
since there is not even the guide of "reasonable" or "actual costs"
that many other states provide.2 92 Moreover, the statute also fails to
286. P.L. 1975, ch. 758 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 408 (1989)).
287. P.L. 1959, ch. 219.
288. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (1944), reprinted in 1943-1944 Me. Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep.
111-12 (quoting 53 C.J. Records § 40 (1931)).
289. P.L. 1975, ch. 758 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 408).
290. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 408 (1989).
291. Id.
292. See e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.2(3) (West 1989) ("The governing body shall
establish reasonable rates and procedures for the retrieval of specified records...");
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 116, para. 206(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) ("Each public body
may charge fees reasonably calculated to reimburse its actual cost for reproducing
."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.03(3) (West 1988) ("the responsible authority may re-
quire the requesting person to pay the actual costs of searching for and retrieving
government data .. ."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.300 (Supp. 1989-1990)
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note whether the "cost of copying" provision includes a public em-
ployee's time spent searching for a requested record. Despite an area
vulnerable to controversy, no case law has emerged from the cost-of-
copying issue.
However, in an opinion issued on the subject of fees, the attorney
general noted that "costs of developing copies of public records may
be an area ripe for rules and regulations. 2 0 3 In the meantime,
though, the attorney general advised the secretary of state that a
"reasonable assessment of the costs attributable to translation or
copying" the requested information should be undertaken and
changed. 2 " The request in this case, a computer tape containing the
names and addresses of all licensed drivers in Maine, was made by
Datatron, a commercial enterprise. Any fees charged in the past for
similar requests would have to be taken into consideration, as long
as charges were based on actual costs.29 5
A corollary to the cost-of-search issue is how far a public agency
must go in compiling requested information that is scattered
throughout numerous files. In Bangor Publishing Co. v. City of Ban-
gor,2 8 the Law Court acknowledged that a governmental entity is
not required to take affirmative steps to gather and compile such
information.29 However, despite the absence of this duty, when a
person requests information that is open to inspection, "and a gov-
ernmental entity knows that it has particular records containing
that information, the entity must at least inform the requesting
party that the material is available and that he may come in and
'inspect and copy' the information sought"
208
By the same token, although the custodian of a public record is
not required to compile requested information into one tidy docu-
ment, the custodian is required to provide inspection of such records
within its jurisdiction. This is true even if the public official's only
source of the requested information is his personal tax return and
the information is available, but scattered throughout the superior
courts of the state, as were the records of service of process fees
collected by the leputy sheriff in Wiggins v. McDevitt.2 '
Finally, there is the issue of commingling, when confidential infor-
mation is interspersed in an otherwise public record. Although com-
("Agencies may impose a reasonable charge....).
293. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 79-161, at 2. The opinion suggested that the Maine Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, M. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 8051-8062, permits agencies
to promulgate fees charged for copying.
294. Id. at 1.
295. Id.
296. 544 A.2d 733 (Me. 1988).
297. Id. at 736.
298. Id.
299. 473 A.2d 420 (Me. 1984). See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text for
a more thorough discussion of the case.
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mingling can be used as a device of abuse by agencies that attempt
to secrete public information behind the cloak of confidentiality,
Maine's FOAA does not expressly prohibit this practice. However,
the Law Court has interpreted the Maine Act as requiring agencies
to release to the public any "segregable portions" of confidential
records. In other words, an agency must release any part of a confi-
dential document that is clearly public record. This rule prevailed in
Guy Gannett Publishing Co. v. University of Maine800 where the
medical information portion of the settlement agreement was de-
leted before release, and in Wiggins"01 where only pertinent portions
of the deputy sheriff's personal tax return could be accessed.
L Section 409: Appeals
Judicial review of only two kinds of governmental conduct is spe-
cific in the Act: denial of public inspection and official action taken
in executive session.302 Yet, this is a leap from the 1959 law, where
no express provision for an appeals process existed.308 In 19751 the
Legislature lavished much attention on this area and created an ap-
peals-remedy section nearly identical to the one in the Act today,
including a provision for nonexclusivity of the remedy provisions.3 0'
Since that time, the only modification has been an abbreviation of
the time period for agency response and requester appeal.30 Thus,
there are currently three subsections in the appeals provision. The
first details the appeals process and remedy where a requester is un-
lawfully denied access to public records, while the second does the
same where an entity unlawfully takes official action during an exec-
utive session. The third subsection expressly deems the above pro-
ceedings to be nonexclusive of other civil remedies.
1. Section 409(1): Records
Although there is no required response time if an agency chooses
to disclose records, an agency or official denying a request to inspect
public records must do so in writing within five working days of the
request and must state the reason for denial.306 This speedy re-
sponse time for a denial, however, is counterbalanced by an equally
300. 555 A.2d 470, 472 (Me. 1989).
301. Wiggins v. McDevitt, 473 A.2d at 424.
302. Ma Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 409 (1989).
303. P.L. 1959, ch. 219. The original Act merely stated: "Nothing contained in
[the FOAA] shall be construed as abridging the right of any citizen or citizens to
appeal to a court of this State for the enforcement of the rights provided for in [the
FOAA]." Id. at § 41.
304. P.L. 1975, ch. 483, repealed and replaced by P.L. 1975 ch. 758 (codified at
Ma REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 409 (1989)).
305. P.L. 1987, ch. 477, § 5 (codified at ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 409(1)
(1989)).
306. M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 409(1) (1989).
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speedy appeals period; the requesting person must appeal the denial
within five working days of receipt of the written notice of refusal.
No other state mandates such a short appeals period.
Thus, the timing in seeking an appeal after an agency denial is
crucial. But it can be easily remedied, as the Law Court affirmed in
Bangor Publishing Co. v. City of Bangor.303 Under the statute's then
ten-day appeal period, Bangor Publishing requested records in April
1987 that were denied in writing on May 1. 301 The newspaper's re-
sponse to the denial was a renewed request on May 14 and a one-
count complaint filed on May 18 seeking review of the May 1 denial.
About one week later, on May 26, the City denied the May 14 re-
quest, and the newspaper the same day amended its complaint by
adding a second count with regard to this second denial. The court
noted that the first count should have been dismissed as untimely,
but that the amended complaint's second count appealing the sec-
ond denial was "clearly timely," as it was filed the very day of the
denial and before the City had answered the complaint 10
Despite the implication in Bangor Publishing that there was a no-
lose opportunity for a requester to comply with this request-and-
denial chronology, the Law Court clarified the rules of the game a
year later, in Guy Gannett Publishing Co. v. Maine Department of
Public Safety.""1 On May 16, 1988, the Kennebec Journal requested
inspection of a letter of discipline issued by the defendant agency to
an investigator in the state fire marshal's office.31 2 Written denial
was made on May 24, but not until June 10, seventeen days later,
did the newspaper file an appeal. In spite of its acknowledgement of
the untimeliness of the appeal,3 13 the superior court reviewed the
denial, noting that the paper could have renewed its request and
followed it with a timely appeal, even though it had not done so. -14
Holding that the action should have been dismissed as untimely,
the Law Court noted that the superior court's judicial economy jus-
307. Id. The 1987 amendment shortened the appeals period from ten working
days to the present five. P1. 1987, ch. 477, § 5.
308. 544 A.2d 733 (Me. 1988).
309. Id. at 734.
310. Id. at 735. The court also dismissed the city's argument that the paper's
amended complaint should have been in the form of a supplemental pleading, which
could have been filed only with court approval under M.R. Civ. P. 15(d), because the
second count included matters occurring after the initial filing. Id. The court aid
that this requirement did not apply, under M.R. Civ. P. 15(a), because the defendant
had not yet filed a responsive pleading. Id.
311. 555 A.2d 474 (Me. 1989).
312. Id. at 475.
313. A new five-working-day appeal limit went into effect Sept. 29, 1987. PJ.
1987, ch. 477, § 5.
314. Guy Gannett Publishing Co. v. Maine Dep't of Public Safety, 555 A.2d at
475.
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tification "overlooks the plain language of the statute."310 Moreover,
the lower court made a "string of assumptions" that were not guar-
anteed to follow: that the newspaper would renew its request, the
agency would again deny, and the newspaper would attempt another
appeal. "It is not for us to speculate on the future action and inter-
action of the parties. '3
16
A further lesson pertaining to timeliness can be gleaned from the
court's dismissal of the newspaper's second contention. Here, Gan-
nett argued that the agency's eight-day response time under a stat-
ute requiring only five days thereby entitled the newspaper to disre-
gard the Act's appeal period. "If Gannett had any remedy for [the
agency]'s violation of section 409(1), it was not to emulate [the
agency]'s disregard for the plain requirements of the statute."317
Unfortunately for the disciplined public employee in Maine De-
partment of Public Safety, the agency had already released the dis-
ciplinary letter to Gannett pursuant to the superior court order.
That court had stated that it was a "final written decision" in a per-
sonnel discipline letter and not confidential pursuant to statute. s
This premature disclosure, found by the Law Court to be unwar-
ranted, could have been avoided if the superior court had honored
the defendant's request for a stay pending appeal. However, the
counterparts of the public employee in Gannett fared better in Mof-
fett v. City of Portland,1 29 where, after having been denied a prelim-
inary injunction against disclosure, they appealed to the Law Court
and were granted a stay pending appeal.3 2 0
Yet, despite the potential for the court-ordered release of docu-
ments that the Law Court ultimately finds to be excepted from the
Act, the records subsection of the appeals provision mandates that
the superior court "shall enter an order for disclosure" if it deter-
mines the agency's denial was "not for just and proper cause. 3 2 1 A
trial de novo, a standard least deferential to agencies, is available to
"any person aggrieved by denial" in any superior court within the
state.3 2 2 Furthermore, the superior courts must give FOAA appeals
315. Id. at 476.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 475. The applicable statute is codified at ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §
7070(2)(E) (1989). Despite the disclosure, the issue was not moot because Gannett's
cross-appeal of a subsequent order denying its motion for contempt contended that
an earlier letter, mentioned within the one disclosed, should have also been disclosed
by defendant. Guy Gannett v. Maine Dep't of Public Safety, 555 A.2d at 475.
319. 400 A.2d 340 (Me. 1979).
320. Despite the absence of a final judgment, the Law Court took the exceptional
measure of permitting appeal due to the possibility that "substantial rights of a party
[would] be irreparably lost if review [were] delayed until final judgment." Id. at 343,
n.8.
321. Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 409(1) (1989).
322. Id.
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precedence over all other actions except writs of habeas corpus and
actions brought by the state against individuals. 2 3
2. Section 409(2): Actions
This subsection details the appeals process pertaining to executive
sessions, but it goes further than the records subsection in directing
liability. Any ordinances, orders, rules, resolutions, regulations, con-
tracts, appointments or other official action taken in an executive
session "shall be illegal and the officials responsible shall be subject
to penalties hereinafter provided.
5 2
'
As with judicial review of public records, this subsection allows
any person to appeal to any superior court in the state for a trial de
novo. These appeals also take precedence over all other cases except
for writs of habeas corpus and actions by the state against individu-
als.32 5 And, if it is found that final action did occur at an executive
session, the court "shall enter an order providing for the action to be
null and void."326
The major difference between the two subsections lies in the time
period for appeals. Whereas any person denied access to public
records must appeal "within five working days of the receipt of the
written notice of denial," any person, "upon learning of any such
action" in executive sessions may appeal. Yet, according to the Law
Court, absence of a time limit does not mean there is a timeless ap-
peals process, for the limitations of Rule 80B of the Maine Rules of
Civil Procedure apply in full force to the judicial review of executive
session actions. 27
3. Section 409(3): Proceedings Not Exclusive
This subsection expressly provides for the nonexclusivity of the
proceedings described above. Thus, any other civil remedy provided
323. Id.
324. MF. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 409(2) (1989). This liability of individual offi-
cials, however, is inconsistent with section 410, which mandates that the agency, not
the individual employee-violator, is subject to a forfeiture of $500.
325. MF. REV. STAT. AN. tit. 1, § 409(2) (1989).
326. Id.
327. Colby v. York County Comm'r, 442 A.2d 544, 546 (Me. 1982).
Rule 80B(b) of the IMR. Civ. P. prescribes a time limit for review of governmental
action: "The time within which review may be sought shall be as provided by statute,
except that if no time limit is specified by statute, the complaint shall be filed within
30 days after notice of any action or refusal to act of which review is Eought .... "
Although section 409 does not provide for appeals of violations of the Freedom of
Access Act occurring in an open meeting, the Law Court has addressed time limits in
such appeals. In 1985 it held that a plaintiff whose land use permit was revoked must
appeal within thirty days of the zoning board of appeals' open meeting, when it took
final action, not from the date of the plaintiff's receipt of that decision. Vachon v.
Town of Kennebunk, 499 A.2d 140, 142 (Me. 1985).
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by law is available. 28
4. Section 410: Violations
A separate violations section has existed since the original enact-
ment of the FOAA in 1959, but since that time the Legislature has
gradually diminished the severity of the consequences for those who
would deny access to public records or governmental meetings. The
original violations provision mandated that "[a] violation ... shall
be punishable by a fine of not more than $500 or by imprisonment
for less than one year."8 29
In the Legislature's 1975 "overhaul" of the FOAA, the violations
section was abbreviated to only fourteen words: "A willful violation
of any requirement of this subchapter is a Class E crime." 30 Al-
though "Class E crime" was added merely to comply with the state's
crime classification,33 1 the addition of "willful," a term of art, indi-
cated the Legislature's new lenient attitude toward violators of the
open government law: not only would a violation have to occur, but
a plaintiff would have to prove that it was a "willful" violation.
In District Attorney for the Fifth Prosecutorial District v. City of
Brewer,3 32 the Law Court noted that the criminal code provides the
definition of "willful" for crimes defined outside its code, "unless the
context of the statute defining the crime clearly requires other-
wise." ' Because the FOAA does not define "willful," the criminal
code's definition applied. Thus, in order to invoke the FOAA's en-
forcement penalties, the agency or official denying access must be
shown to have done so willfully.
Moreover, in District Attorney the court affirmed the superior
court's dismissal of an action seeking a declaration that the city's
past meetings, executive sessions and other actions were violations
of the FOAA. The court stated that no issue of law existed as to the
construction of "willful"; whether a meeting is in violation of the
FOAA and whether the conduct of public officals was willful are fac-
tual issues to be decided "on a case-by-case basis. '8 34 Even if a de-
claratory judgment could properly be used to determine an issue of
fact, the court noted that "in this case doing so serves no useful
purpose. Here, the factual determinations concern only past con-
duct. . . . The Superior Court was not called upon to declare
328. MF REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 409(3) (1989).
329. P.L. 1959, ch. 219.
330. P.L. 1975, ch. 758 (codified at MF Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 410 (1989)).
331. P.L. 1975, ch. 740, § 14 (codified at Mp REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 4-A
(1983)). A Class E crime was one for which punishment did not exceed one year.
332. 543 A.2d 837 (Me. 1988).
333. Id. at 838 (quoting M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 6(1) (1983)). This case
was decided in 1988, after the most recent amendment to section 410, but the con-
struction of "willful," still present in the FOAA, applies with equal force.
334. Id. at 839.
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whether a specific act, certain to occur in the future, is a crime."'" 5
The most recent amendment, in 1987, designated a violation as a
civil infraction rather than a crime, yet maintained "a forfeiture of
not more than $500."330 In addition, for the first time the section
expressly named the party liable for the forfeiture: "the state gov-
ernment agency or local government entity whose officer or em-
ployee committed the violation."" 7 Therefore, unlike other states,
Maine shields the violating employee from liability.m
lV. PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The Legislature's last truly comprehensive reworking of the
FOAA occurred in 1975, when it narrowed the public records defini-
tion, tightened the restrictions on executive sessions, and added
more exceptions than it removed. A renewed scrutiny is needed, al-
though to strengthen it, not to disable its effectiveness in opening
government to the people. The Act's most vulnerable spot, the ex-
emption for records "designated confidential by statute," has been
the most widely used device for chipping away at the scope of the
FOAA.
The following section will suggest a number of areas in the FOAA
calling for legislative attention. The solutions offered are drawn
from the freedom of information statutes of other states.
A. Make the FOAA User-Friendly
If any right-to-know law is to succeed, the public must know
about it and feel at ease employing it to gain access to the govern-
ment's business. Although freedom of information creates adminis-
trative costs, it should not create attorney's fees for a wrongly de-
nied requester. "Every person" has the right to inspect public
records and attend public meetings, but if seemingly insurmounta-
ble and costly barriers are erected, few persons will attempt to in-
voke these rights.
1. Clearly Define Which Entities are Subject to the FOAA
In interpreting the scope of "public proceedings" within the
meaning of the FOAA, the Law Court in Lewiston Daily Sun v. City
of Auburn 39 did not hesitate to include the city's special civil ser-
vice study committee. Although its decision provides some guide-
lines as to which entities are subject to the Act, the attorney general
335. Id.
336. P.L. 1987, ch. 477, § 6 (codified at M&. REv. STAT. Am. tit. 1, § 410 (1989)).
337. Id.
338. See Braverman & Heppler, supra note 94, at 755 for a survey of other state'
violations provisions.
339. 544 A.2d 335 (Me. 1988).
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as well as the public are operating bereft of a "magic formula."' 4
Thus, it is crucial that the Legislature clearly define "public pro-
ceeding" and also close the loopholes currently available to those
eager to carry on the government's business behind closed doors.
First, to insure that the public policy is executed, the meetings of
any board, committee, special committee, subcommittee, blue rib-
bon committee or commission, regardless of appellation affixed and
however created or constituted within the executive or legislative
branches, must comply with the Act. Other states have recognized
the potential for abuse and have included language in their statu-
tory definitions that closes loopholes and broadens the applicability
to include entities "however created, 3 4 1 "by whatever name desig-
nated,"342 created by "executive order, u"3 and "specifically charged
by any other public official, body, or agency to advise or to make
reports, investigations or recommendations. '3 4'
Second, any entity that is publicly funded, in part or in whole,
also must open its meetings and records to the public pursuant to
the Act. Several states have included such provisions in their defini-
tions of public body: "supported in whole or in part by tax revenue,
or which expend tax revenue"1; 3 4 5 "receiving or expending and sup-
ported in whole or in part by public funds";'4 and "expends or dis-
burses any public funds. 3 4 7 Such a provision in the Maine statute
would have brought the Maine Potato Council, supported by twenty
percent of the potato tax, 48 and the Blue Ribbon Commission on
Corrections,3 '0 supported by a $25,000 appropriation from the Legis-
lature, into the ambit of the Act.
Finally, the advisory nature of an entity should not be cause for
exemption from public scrutiny. Indeed, the proceedings of advisory
bodies yield crucial information upon which formal decisions are
made. If advisory entities are allowed to operate in secrecy, the so-
called decision-making bodies could be reduced to rubber-stamping
functions while the real work is done behind closed doors by "advi-
340. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 80-95 at 3.
341. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A (West 1989).
342. IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-2(a)(1) (Burns 1987).
343. MIsS. CODE ANN. § 25-41-3(a) (Supp. 1989); MD. STATE GOVERNMENT CODE
ANN. § 10-501(g)(2)(vi) (1984); IOWA CODE § 21.2(1)(a) (1989).
344. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, 1 10002(a) (Supp. 1988).
345. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 41.02 (Smith-Hurd 1987).
346. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4318 (1989).
347. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(a) (Supp. 1988). See also Miss. CODE ANN. §
25-41-3(a) (Supp. 1989) ("supported wholly or in part by public funds or expends
public funds").
348. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (July 26, 1978). See also supra note 75 and accompany-
ing text.
349. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 85-19. See also supra notes 73-74, 108-110 and accompa-
nying text.
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sory" bodies.3 50 Several states now include provisions in their free-
dom of information laws to encompass public bodies whose task is
solely advisory- any "policy-making entity";351 "[a]n advisory board,
advisory commission, or task force created by the governor or the
general assembly to develop and make recommendations on public
policy issues"; 52 and [a]ny advisory commission, committee, or body
created by statute, ordinance, or executive order to advise the gov-
erning body of a public agency.1 35 3
Even at the federal level, Congress has enacted the Federal Advi-
sory Committee Act, which regulates "any committee, board, com-
mission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar
group" that has been created for the purpose of advising or making
recommendations to the president, an agency or an official.35 Notice
of the meetings of such bodies must be published in the Federal
Register 55 and their meetings350 and records 3 7 are open to public
scrutiny.3 58 Congress apparently comprehended the need to encom-
pass the meetings and records of advisory bodies.35 0
2. Make Any Exceptions to the FOAA Easy to Locate
Even if the definition clearly indicates the entities whose meetings
and records are subject to the FOAA, there remains a multitude of
exemptions to the public records provision, found in section 402(3).
Although this section lists seven exemptions, only six are substan-
tive. It is the first, "designated confidential by statute," that could
leave the requester in a quandary despite the availability of a partial
listing of "confidential" records in the general index of the Maine
Revised Statutes Annotated. The FOAA should be as self-contained
as possible, facilitating understanding, scope and use by as large a
350. For a debate of this argument in the context of a similnr situation regarding
whether the committees and subcommittees of the Boards of Trustees of higher edu-
cation should be exempt, see supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
351. M iS. CoDE ANN. § 25-41-3(a) (Supp. 1989).
352. IOWA CODE ANN. § 21.2(1)(e) (1989).
353. IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-2(a)(5) (Burns 1987).
354. 5 U.S.C.A. app. § 3 (West Supp. 1990).
355. 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990).
356. See id. § 10(c).
357. See id. §§ 10(b)-(c).
358. However, this openness does not apply when the president or head of the
agency determines that such meetings shall be closed for statutorily enumerated pur-
poses, including national security and personnel matters. 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(d)
(West Supp. 1990).
359. See Washington Legal Found. v. American Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on
Fed. Judiciary, 648 F. Supp. 1353, 1358-59 (D.C. 1986) ("The central purpome of the
Act is to 'control the advisory committee process and to open to public scrutiny the
manner in which government agencies obtain advice from private individuals and
groups.' ") (citing HLI Lordship Indus., Inc. v. Committee for Purchase from the
Blind, 615 F. Supp. 970, 978 (E.D. Va. 1985)).
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segment of the public as possible. For example, most states that
contain the "confidential by statute" exemption follow that cursory
provision with a list of substantive exemptions that go beyond the
FOAA's short list. Iowa has a paradigmatic public records statute in
this regard, as it enumerates in detail twenty-six areas of exempted
information, nearly identical to those Maine has scattered through-
out its fifty-four titles.36 0 Following the Iowa model, the Maine Leg-
islature could easily consolidate all of its confidentiality provisions
and incorporate them in the FOAA, where they are most
pertinent. 61
3. Require Each Agency to Index Available Records
The most effective right-to-know law should assist the public in
gaining access to information that is open to the public. The federal
FOIA requires each agency to "maintain and make available for
public inspection and copying current indexes providing identifying
information for the public as to any matter issued, adopted, or
promulgated ... and required ... to be made available or
published."3 2
Only a handful of states track the federal FOIA in this area,
Washington's statute being the most explicit: "Each local agency
shall maintain and make available for public inspection and copying
a current index providing identifying information.. . ."363 Although
extra costs may be incurred in indexing available public records
within an agency, the benefits to both the agency and public out-
weigh the expense an open government brings.
4. Waive the Copy Fees for Requests Pertaining to the Public
Interest
Maine's FOAA prescribes payment of "the cost of translation"
where an agency's records must be changed from its original me-
dium to one amenable to inspection. Yet, beyond that there is no
reference as to which party pays copying costs. Most states require
that search and copy fees be "reasonable ''se or "actual costs." 805
However reasonable, fees build barriers to access of the public's
360. IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.7 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
361. For another example of such consolidation see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-19
(1988), which has incorporated by reference all other confidentiality provisions under
its exemptions section of its FOI Act.
362. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(2)(c) (1977).
363. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.17.260(2) (West Supp. 1990).
364. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.874 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986); IOWA CODE ANN, §
22.3 (West 1989).
365. MiNN. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.03(3) (West 1986). Some states mandate that
such costs be set by law. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-2 (West 1989). If a price has
not been determined, the custodian shall charge 50 cents for each page up to 10 pages
and 10 cents for each page over 20. Id.
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business, and Congress recognized this when it amended the FOIA
in 1986, requiring that only persons requesting information for com-
mercial use pay more than "reasonable standard charges" for copy-
ing.3e6 Representatives of the press and scientific and educational
institutions are exempt from commercial status. Noncommercial re-
quests, therefore, are entitled to a reduced fee or a waiver "if disclo-
sure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to
contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or
activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial
interest of the requester. 3 6 7
Connecticut is one of the few states with fee provisions similar to
that of the federal FOIA. It provides a waiver of fees for three situa-
tions: 1) where the person requesting the records is indigent, 2)
where the records requested are not public (search fees are waived),
and 3) where an agency determines that "compliance with the appli-
cant's request benefits the general welfare." 068 Although such a pro-
vision empowers an agency with great discretion, it does allow for
the possibility of reduced or waived fees not presently available in
the Maine FOAA. Any provision for fee reduction, however, should
expressly include representatives of the press.
B. Make the Appeals Process Less Intimidating and More
Rewarding
The cavernous room of a superior court and the attendant need to
hire an attorney are intimidating barriers to seeking appeal of a
public official's negative response to a request for inspection of a
record or access to a meeting. Therefore, until such obstructions are
eliminated, the public will take an agency's "no" for an answer
rather than go to the expense of appeal.
1. Lengthen the Appeals Period to Thirty Days
Maine's FOAA requires that a requester who has been denied ac-
cess to inspection of a public record appeal within five working days
of receipt of that denial389 Such an abbreviated appeals period is
not only draconian but it is the most severe of all fifty states' stat-
utes. Moreover, it has led to a comic requester's game of request-
366. Pub. L. No. 99-570, Title 1, sec. 1803, Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3207-48 to 49
(codified at 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II) (West Supp. 1990) (fee3 are limited to
reasonable standard charges when request is made "by an educational or noncommer-
cial scientific institution, whose purpose is scholarly or scientific research, or a repre-
sentative of the news media .... ). Moreover, attorney fees may be awarded to
those plaintiffs who successfully appeal an agency's denial of a fee waiver. Ettlinger v.
FBI, 596 F. Supp. 867, 879 (D. Mass. 1984).
367. 5 U.S.C-. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii) (West Supp. 1990).
368. CoNN. GmN. STAT. ANN. 1-15 (West 1988).
369. M , Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 409 (1989).
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and-re-request, as seen in Bangor Publishing Co. v. City of
Bangor.3
7 0
The appeals period for an executive session, although not ex-
pressly provided for, has been interpreted to comply with Rule 80B
of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, which grants a thirty-day
period for review "if no time limit is specified by statute." There-
fore, the Legislature should either simply delete the "within five
working days" language and allow Rule 80B to control or, better,
expressly provide for a "within 30 days of receipt of denial" clause
to better aid the statute's reader who may be unfamiliar with the
rules of civil procedure.
2. Expressly Provide for Attorney's Fees to be Awarded to a
Prevailing Plaintiff
Persons appealing denials under Maine's FOAA gain the satisfac-
tion of contributing to open government, but they reap no other re-
wards. Indeed, an appellant never emerges financially better off,
since all attorney's fees are borne by the requester. Even though it is
possible to request attorney's fees as part of the judgment, there are
no assurances unless the Legislature expressly allows for them to be
paid by the agency that unduly denied access to the government's
business.
Once again, such a requirement may result in additional expenses
to the operation of government, but that has not prevented Congress
from including in the FOIA the provision that "[t]he court may as-
sess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other
litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in
which the complainant has substantially prevailed. '3 71 Although the
court retains discretion in the award of costs and fees, at least it has
been noted that the legislative intent to bring such a possibility of
recovery is brought to bear.
Other state statutes address the issue in various ways: some allow
the court to award attorney's fees only where the agency has acted
"unlawfully 3 72 or "in bad faith, or in an arbitrary or capricious
manner. '37 3 One state even allows such an award in proportion to
the success of the complainant.3 7 4
370. 544 A.2d 733 (Me. 1988). For a more detailed discussion of the actions re-
questers have been forced to take to evade the short appeals period, see supra notes
308-17 and accompanying text.
371. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1977). A plaintiff may have "substantially pro-
vailed" even where the agency releases the requested information prior to final judg-
ment- "Recent court decisions and the legislative history of section 552(a)(4)(E) sup-
port... [the conclusion that] a judgment is not an absolute prerequisite to an award
of attorney fees." Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
372. F". STAT. ANN. § 119.12(1) (West Supp. 1990).
373. ARZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-121.02(B) (West 1985).
374. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.882(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1986). A complainant
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The Maine Legislature should address the attorney's fees issue in
a manner that will encourage public utilization of the FOAA.
3. Create an Intermediate Appeals Level between Agency and
Superior Court
Even if a requesting member of the public has some assurance of
not having to incur court costs and attorney's fees, the intimidating
nature of the adversary system is enough to discourage appeal of
agency denials. There are currently two states, Connecticut and New
York, that interpose dispute resolution bodies between the agency
and the superior court, providing an intermediate safe haven for re-
questers who would otherwise forego an appeal378
Connecticut's structure, however, represents the model the Maine
Legislature should follow. There, a Freedom of Information Com-
mission was created to take appeals from aggrieved requesters. The
commission is composed of five members, appointed by the gover-
nor, confirmed by either house, and who serve four-year terms.370 No
more than three members may be of the same political party.1 7 A
person denied the right to inspect a record or attend a meeting may
appeal to the commission within thirty days after the denial, and a
hearing will be heard within thirty days after receipt of a notice of
appeal and decided within sixty days after the hearing.378 The pro-
cess is expedited in the case of allegedly unlawful executive sessions:
a preliminary hearing is held within seventy-two hours of receipt of
a complaint.3 7 9 The commission, enabled by statute to investigate
violations, administer oaths, examine witnesses, receive evidence,
and subpoena witnesses,3S° issues a decision that is subject to judi-
cial review.381
CONCLUSION
The erosion of the public's right to know in Maine is plainly evi-
dent when observed over its thirty-year life span, but every legisla-
tive amendment that permits the government to operate beyond
public scrutiny contributes to long-term destruction. The Legisla-
ture in 1959, by embracing the concept of freedom of information,
requesting ten records and prevailing on five would be awarded half of the attorney's
fees. In addition, the court has discretion to award up to $25 for each day the re-
quester was denied access. Id.
375. For a thorough examination of proposed utilization of a dispute resolution
process with regard to te federal FOIA, see Grunewald, Freedom of Information Act
Dispute Resolution, 40 ADnwN. L. Rnv. 1 (1988).
376. CoNN. GN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21j(a) (West 1988).
377. Id.
378. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21i(b) (West Supp. 1990).
379. Id.
380. Id. § 1-21j(d).
381. Id. § 1-21i(d).
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boldly rejected the common law notions that public records were
only those statutorily deemed as such and that public records could
be inspected by only those persons with a particular interest. The
tide of the public's right to know has undoubtedly turned since the
common law days, but the tide has again ebbed since the inception
of the FOAA, a statute initially unfettered by myriad exceptions.
The tinkering in 1989 with one of those exceptions, the prohibition
of access to the names and addresses of applicants for public sector
jobs, is but the most recent example of a grant of secrecy to govern-
ment transactions.
Beyond legislative repairs, however, the solution to an open gov-
ernment rests with the public, for it is the public's business that is
at stake. If the public is unaware of its right to access to government
records and meetings or believes it is not empowered to overcome
denials to its requests, then even the most literal freedom of infor-
mation act serves no useful purpose. The greatest tool for prying
open governmental business is an educated public, operating within
the statutory framework of a liberal freedom of access act.
APPENDIX
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 1, §§ 401-410
SUBCHAPTER 1
FREEDOM OF ACCESS
§ 401. Declaration of public policy; rules of construction
The Legislature finds and declares that public proceedings exist to
aid in the conduct of the people's business. It is the intent of the
Legislature that their actions be taken openly and that the records
of their actions be open to public inspection and their deliberations
be conducted openly. It is further the intent of the Legislature that
clandestine meetings, conferences or meetings held on private prop-
erty without proper notice and ample opportunity for attendance by
the public not be used to defeat the purposes of this subchapter.
This subchapter shall be liberally construed and applied to pro-
mote its underlying purposes and policies as contained in the decla-
ration of legislative intent.
§ 402. Definitions
1. Conditional approval. Approval of an application or grant-
ing of a license, certificate or any other type of permit upon condi-
tions not otherwise specifically required by the statute, ordinance or
regulation pursuant to which the approval or granting is issued.
2. Public proceedings. The term "public proceedings" as used
in this subchapter shall mean the transactions of any functions af-
fecting any or all citizens of the State by any of the following:
A. The Legislature of Maine and its committees and
subcommittees;
B. Any board or commission of any state agency or authority, the
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Board of Trustees of the University of Maine System and any of its
committees and subcommittees, the Board of Trustees of the
Maine Maritime Academy and any of its committees and subcom-
mittees, the Board of Trustees of the Maine Technical College Sys-
tem and any of its committees and subcommittees;
C. Any board, commission, agency or authority of any county, mu-
nicipality, school district or any regional or other political or ad-
ministrative subdivision; and
D. The full membership meetings of any association, the member-
ship of which is composed exclusively of counties, municipalities,
school administrative units or other political or administrative sub-
divisions; of boards, commissions, agencies or authorities of any
such subdivisions; or of any combination of any of these entities.
3. Public records. The term "public records" means any writ-
ten, printed or graphic matter or any mechanical or electronic data
compilation from which information can be obtained, directly or af-
ter translation into a form susceptible of visual or aural comprehen-
sion, that is in the possession or custody of an agency or public offi-
cial of this State or any of its political subdivisions, or is in the
possession or custody of an association, the membership of which is
composed exclusively of one or more of any of these entities, and has
been received or prepared for use in connection with the transaction
of public or governmental business or contains information relating
to the transaction of public or governmental business, except*
A. Records that have been designated confidential by statute;
B. Records that would be within the scope of a privilege against
discovery or use as evidence recognized by the courts of this State
in civil or criminal trials if the records or inspection thereof were
sought in the course of a court proceeding;
C. Records, working papers and interoffice and intraoffice memo-
randa used or maintained by any Legislator, legislative agency or
legislative employee to prepare proposed Senate or House papers
or reports for consideration by the Legislature or any of its com-
mittees during the biennium in which the proposal or report is
prepared;
D. Material prepared for and used specifically and exclusively in
preparation for negotiations, including the development of bargain-
ing proposals to be made and the analysis of proposals received, by
a public employer in collective bargaining with its employees and
their designated representatives;
E. Records, working papers, interoffice and intraoffice memoranda
used by or prepared for faculty and administrative committees of
the Maine Maritime Academy, the Maine Technical College Sys-
tem and the University of Maine System. The provisions of this
paragraph do not apply to the boards of trustees and the commit-
tees and subcommittees of those boards, which are referred to in
subsection 2, paragraph B;
F. Records that would be confidential if they were in the possession
or custody of an agency or public official of the State or any of its
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political or administrative subdivisions are confidential if those
records are in the possession of an association, the membership of
which is composed exclusively of one or more political or adminis-
trative subdivisions of the State; of boards, commissions, agencies
or authorities of any such subdivisions; or of any combination of
any of these entities; and
G. Materials related to the development of positions on legislation
or materials that are related to insurance or insurance-like protec-
tion or services which are in the possession of an association, the
membership of which is composed exclusively of one or more politi-
cal or administrative subdivisions of the State; of boards, commis-
sions, agencies or authorities of any such subdivisions; or of any
combination of any of these entities.
§ 403. Meetings to be open to public
Except as otherwise provided by statute or by section 405, all
public proceedings shall be open to the public, any person shall be
permitted to attend any public proceeding and any record or min-
utes of such proceedings that is required by law shall be made
promptly and shall be open to public inspection.
§ 404. Recorded or live broadcasts authorized
In order to facilitate the public policy so declared by the Legisla-
ture of opening the public's business to public scrutiny, all persons
shall be entitled to attend public proceedings and to make written,
taped or filmed records of the proceedings, or to live broadcast the
same, provided the writing, taping, filming or broadcasting does not
interfere with the orderly conduct of proceedings. The body or
agency holding the public proceedings may make reasonable rules
and regulations governing these activities, so long as these rules or
regulations do not defeat the purpose of this subchapter.
§ 405. Executive sessions
Those bodies or agencies falling within this subchapter may hold
executive sessions subject to the following conditions.
1. Not to defeat purposes of subchapter. These sessions
shall not be used to defeat the purposes of this subchapter as stated
in section 401.
2. Final approval of certain items prohibited. No ordi-
nances, orders, rules, resolutions, regulations, contracts, appoint-
ments or other official actions shall be finally approved at executive
sessions.
3. Procedure for calling of executive sessions. Executive
sessions may be called only by a public, recorded vote of 3/5 of the
members, present and voting, of such bodies or agencies.
4. Motion contents. A motion to go into executive session shall
indicate the precise nature of the business of the executive session.
5. Matters not contained in motion prohibited. No other
matters may be considered in that particular executive session.
6. Permitted deliberation. Deliberations may be conducted in
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executive sessions on the following matters and no others:
A. Discussion or consideration of the employment, appointment,
assignment, duties, promotion, demotion, compensation, evalua-
tion, disciplining, resignation or dismissal of an individual or group
of public officials, appointees or employees of the body or agency or
the investigation or hearing of charges or complaints against a per-
son or persons subject to the following conditions:
(1) An executive session may be held only if public dis-
cussion could be reasonably expected to cause damage to
the reputation or the individual's right to privacy would
be violated;
(2) Any person charged or investigated shall be permitted
to be present at an executive session if that person desires;
(3) Any person charged or investigated may request in
writing that the investigation or hearing of charges or
complaints against him be conducted in open session. A
request, if made to the agency, must be honored; and
(4) Any person bringing charges, complaints or allegations
of misconduct against the individual under discussion
shall be permitted to be present.
This paragraph does not apply to discussion of a budget or budget
proposal;
B. Discussion or consideration by a school board of suspension or
expulsion of a public school student or a student at a private
school, the cost of whose education is paid from public funds, pro-
vided that:
(1) 1 The student and legal counsel and, if the student be a
minor, the student's parents or legal guardians shall be
permitted to be present at an executive session if the stu-
dent, parents or guardians so desire.
C. Discussion or consideration of the condition, acquisition or the
use of real or personal property permanently attached to real prop-
erty or interests therein or disposition of publicly held property or
economic development only if premature disclosures of the infor-
mation would prejudice the competitive or bargaining position of
the body or agency;,
D. Negotiations between the representatives of a public employer
and public employees may be open to the public provided both
parties agree to conduct negotiations in open sessions. Discussion
of labor contracts and proposals and meetings between a public
agency and its negotiators may be held in an executive session.
E. Consultations between a body or agency and its attorney con-
cerning the legal rights and duties of the body or agency, pending
or contemplated litigation, settlement offers and matters where the
duties of the public body's counsel to his client pursuant to the
code of professional responsibility clearly conflict with this sub-
chapter or where premature general public knowledge would
1. So in original No subpar. (2) was enacted.
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clearly place the State, municipality or other public agency or per-
son at a substantial disadvantage.
F. Discussions of information contained in records made, main-
tained or received by a body or agency when access by the general
public to those records is prohibited by statute.
§ 406. Public notice
Public notice shall be given for all public proceedings as defined
in section 402, if these proceedings are a meeting of a body or
agency consisting of 3 or more persons. This notice shall be given in
ample time to allow public attendance and shall be disseminated in
a manner reasonably calculated to notify the general public in the
jurisdiction served by the body or agency concerned. In the event of
an emergency meeting, local representatives of the media shall be
notified of the meeting, whenever practical, the notification to in-
clude time and location, by the same or faster means used to notify
the members of the agency conducting the public proceeding.
§ 407. Decisions
1. Conditional approval or denial. Every agency shall make a
written record of every decision involving the conditional approval
or denial of an application, license, certificate or any other type of
permit. The agency shall set forth in the record the reason or rea-
sons for its decision and make finding of the fact, in writing, suffi-
cient to appraise [sic] the applicant and any interested member of
the public of the basis for the decision. A written record or a copy
thereof shall be kept by the agency and made available to any inter-
ested member of the public who may wish to review it.
2. Dismissal or refusal to renew contract. Every agency
shall make a written record of every decision involving the dismissal
or the refusal to renew the contract of any public official, employee
or appointee. The agency shall, except in case of probationary em-
ployees, set forth in the record the reason or reasons for its decision
and made findings of fact, in writing, sufficient to appraise [sic] the
individual concerned and any interested member of the public of the
basis for the decision. A written record or a copy thereof shall be
kept by the agency and made available to any interested member of
the public who may wish to review it.
§ 408. Public records available for public inspection
Except as otherwise provided by statute, every person shall have
the right to inspect and copy any public record during the regular
business hours of the custodian or location of such record; provided
that, whenever inspection cannot be accomplished without transla-
tion of mechanical or electronic data compilation into some other
form, the person desiring inspection may be required to pay the
State in advance the cost of translation and both translation and
inspection may be scheduled to occur at such time as will not delay
or inconvenience the regular activities of the agency or official hav-
ing custody of the record sought and provided further that the cost
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of copying any public record to comply with this section shall be
paid by the person requesting the copy.
§ 409. Appeals
1. Record. If any body or agency or official, who has custody or
control of any public record, shall refuse permission to so inspect or
copy or abstract a public record, this denial shall be made by the
body or agency or official in writing, stating the reason for the de-
nial, within 5 working days of the request for inspection by any per-
son. Any person aggrieved by denial may appeal therefrom, within 5
working days of the receipt of the written notice of denial, to any
Superior Court within the State. If a court, after a trial de novo,
determines such denial was not for just and proper cause, it shall
enter an order for disclosure. Appeals shall be privileged in respect
to their assignment for trial over all other actions except writs of
habeas corpus and actions brought by the State against individuals.
2. Actions. If any body or agency approves any ordinances, or-
ders, rules, resolutions, regulations, contracts, appointments or other
official action in an executive session, this action shall be illegal and
the officials responsible shall be subject to the penalties hereinafter
provided. Upon learning of any such action, any person may appeal
to any Superior Court in the State. If a court, after a trial de devo,
determines this action was taken illegally in an executive session, it
shall enter an order providing for the action to be null and void.
Appeals shall be privileged in respect to their assignment for trial
over all other actions except writs of habeas corpus or actions
brought by the State against individuals.
3. Proceedings not exclusive. The proceedings authorized by
this section shall not be exclusive of any other civil remedy provided
by law.
§ 410 Violations
For every willful violation of this subchapter, the state govern-
ment agency or local government entity whose officer or employee
committed the violation shall be liable for a civil violation for which
a forfeiture of not more than $500 may be adjudged.
Anne C. Lucey
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